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ABSTRACT 
 
A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
AVAILABLE FOR ISRAEL IN RESPONSE TO IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
Yazıcı,Emir 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Özgür Özdamar 
July 2014 
Israel is the most concerned actor about Iran’s nuclear program due to its 
geographical position and fragile relations with Iran. Thus, Israel’s stance towards 
Iran’s nuclear program is particularly important in the nuclear crisis between Iran 
and the West. This thesis evaluates the four possible strategic options available for 
Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program: controlling strategy, deterrence strategy, 
reassurance strategy, and combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies. 
Through a game theoretic approach, it is aimed to answer the questions thatwhat are 
the advantages and limitations of these strategies and which one would be the best 
option for Israel. Moreover, the underlying dynamics of each strategic option and 
their influence on the players’ choices are also presented through the extensive form 
game models. As a response to questions mentioned above, this thesis argues that 
instead of a pure deterrence, controlling, or reassurance strategy, combination of 
reassurance and deterrence strategies would promise better outcomes for Israel.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
İRAN’IN NÜKLEER PROGRAMI KARŞISINDA İSRAİL’İN MEVCUT 
STRATEJİK SEÇENEKLERİNİN OYUN KURAMI İLE ANALİZİ 
Yazıcı, Emir 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doçent Doktor Özgür Özdamar 
Temmuz 2014 
Coğrafi pozisyonu ve İran ile olan kırılgan ilişkileri nedeniyle İran’ın nükleer 
programı hakkında en endişeli aktör İsrail’dir. Bu nedenle İsrail’in İran’ın nükleer 
programına yönelik tavrı İran ve Batı arasındaki nükleer krizde  özel bir önem teşkil 
etmektedir. Bu tez İran’ın nükleer programı karşısında İsrail’in kullanabileceği dört 
muhtemel stratejik seçeneği değerlendirmektedir: kontrol stratejisi, caydırıcılık 
stratejisi, güven verme (reassurance) stratejisi, caydırıcılık ve güven verme 
(reassurance) stratejilerinin kombinasyonu. Oyun kuramı aracılığıyla, bu stratejilerin 
İsrail için avantajları ve kısıtlılıkları nelerdir ve hangisi  İsrail için en uygun seçenek 
olabilir soruları cevaplandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca yaygın biçim oyun modelleri 
aracılığıyla her bir stratejik seçeneğin temel dinamikleri ve bunların oyuncuların 
seçimleri üzerindeki etkisi sunulmuştur. Yukarıda bahsedilen sorulara cevaben bu 
tez, saf bir caydırıcılık, kontrol ya da güven verme (reassurance) stratejisindenziyade, 
vi 
 
caydırıcılık ve güven verme (reassurance) stratejilerinin kombinasyonunun İsrail için 
daha iyi sonuç verebileceğini savunmaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler:İran’ın Nükleer Programı, İsrail, Oyun Kuramı, Kontrol 
Stratejisi, Caydırıcılık Stratejisi, Güven Veme Stratejisi 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1.Introduction to Research 
Iran’s nuclear program has been occupying the international actors’ agenda 
for a long time. Despite the numerous attempts, any permanent agreement has not 
been reached yet. Recently, the nuclear negotiations was started again between Iran 
and the P5 + 1(EU3 + 3) and a joint plan of action was accepted in 2013. According 
to both sides there is a significant possibility of reaching a permanent agreement in 
2014. However, the statements of the Israeli officials indicate that Israel is not 
content with this process, since it does not trust Iran’s being intentions regarding 
nuclear technology. 
In this sense, the starting point of this research is that Israel is the most 
concerned actor about Iran’s nuclear program, due to its geographical position and 
fragile relations with Iran. In this research, it is assumed that Israel’s role in this issue 
is underestimated. If Israel succeeds in employing a wise strategy that can reduce the 
likelihood of conflict, it can pave the way for a solution which would be able to 
dispel other parties’ concerns as well. Thus, it is important to analyze Israel’s stance 
towards Iran’s nuclear program and evaluate possible strategic options for Israel. 
Moreover, analysis of the Israel’s strategic options allows us to test and compare the 
expanded the literature of deterrence theory and other strategies as well (e.g. 
reassurance) in a current case. Consequently, this thesis attempts to answer the 
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questions that what are the advantages and limitations ofeach strategic option 
available for Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program and which one would be the 
best option for Israel. 
In this research, four strategic options are defined as the possible strategic 
options: controlling, coercion (deterrence), reassurance, and the combination of 
deterrence and reassurance strategies. Firstly, it is assumed that Israel would continue 
to implement a controlling strategy, in the form of economic and financial sanctions, 
in accord with the international community. Moreover, it can use other forms of 
controlling strategy, such as limited military operations or covert operations. 
Secondly, it can attempt to deter Iran by threatening with use of force if it does not 
comply with the demands of Israel. Thirdly, Israel can reassure Iran regarding its 
security concerns which would lead it to acquire nuclear weapons capability, if any. 
Finally, a combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies can be implemented 
in order to avoid the limitations of each strategy separately. Within this framework, 
this research aims to present what the conditions are that would make deterrence or 
controlling strategy efficient; whether Israel can meet the requirements of these 
strategies against Iran; whether reassurance is a wise strategy that can achieve the 
desired outcome with lower cost; or  whether the combination of deterrence and 
reassurance strategies would be the ideal option.  
A game-theoretic methodology is used in order to analyze these strategic 
options. Four extensive game form models are designed for each strategic option. It 
is intended to present the strategic interactions between the actors’ decisions at the 
different stages of the game. Moreover, the wide range of theoretical perspectives, 
which includes both coercive and consensual approaches, is presented through a 
disciplined research method. Even though the game-theoretic modelling required 
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exclusion of the some aspects of the case in order to preserve the simplicity, it 
provided transparency and reproducibility to the research.  
 
1.2.Main Findings 
The main findings underline that the costs of actions and probabilities of 
success have the capability to change the equilibria of the games. Therefore, the 
important question is whether Israel can increase the cost of not backing down to 
Iran and probability of success of its deterrent threat, while decreasing the cost of its 
actions to itself. In today’s conditions, Israel lacks the capability that can balance 
these costs and probabilities. For instance, lack of intelligence about Iran’s nuclear 
facilities decreases the likelihood of victory of a possible military attack as part of 
controlling strategy or as a deterrent threat. Also, the lack of international support for 
a deterrence strategy increases the cost of deterrent actions to Israel. Additionally, 
Iran’s economy of resistance decreases the cost of controlling strategy to Iran. All 
these negative factors problematize the deterrence and controlling strategies by 
changing the costs and probabilities of the actions. Moreover, these two strategies are 
too risky in the sense of provoking Iran and breaking the status-quo irreversibly. This 
is why there is no “maintain status-quo” option for Iran in the models of these 
strategies. 
On the other hand, reassurance strategy promises better outcomes with lower 
costs, but it makes Israel vulnerable against Iran if the strategy fails. At this point, the 
combination of deterrence and reassurance comes up with the claim that it can 
provide the better outcomes of reassurance without leaving Israel vulnerable in the 
case that Iran acts in a hostile manner. The findings regarding the model of 
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combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies indicate that the existence of a 
deterrent threat in the sub-games increases the capability of reassurance strategy at 
the beginning. Moreover, since Israel starts with reassurance strategy it avoids 
provoking Iran, and so the status-quo can be still sustained even if the strategy fails.  
The findings of this thesis, firstly, contributes the literature regarding Israel’s 
foreign policy in response to Iran’s nuclear program in the sense of both including 
wide-range of strategic approaches in the same research, and using a game-theoretic 
approach. Moreover, the model of the combination of deterrence and reassurance 
strategies, which is introduced as an alternative to deterrence in the literature, is 
tested in a current case. The findings mostly supported the argument that a 
combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies would promise better outcomes 
compared to deterrence strategy. 
 
1.3.Thesis Overview 
In the introduction chapter, firstly, I introduce the subject and its importance. I 
answer the question that why Israel’s stance is important in the debate about Iran’s 
nuclear program. Then, the research question, the objective of the research, and the 
methodology is stated. Additionally, the main findings of the research and 
contributions to the literature are presented. 
 Secondly, the steps in the evolution of Iran’s nuclear program and its future, and 
Israel’s threat perceptions regarding Iran’s nuclear activities are explained briefly. 
Based on the Israel’s threat perceptions, the four strategic options available for Israel 
– controlling, deterrence, reassurance, and combination of deterrence and 
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reassurance- are discussed theoretically first. Next, it is explained that what these 
strategies mean for Israel against Iran. 
In the third chapter, firstly, it is explained that why a game-theoretic 
methodology is preferred and why the models are designed as extensive form game 
models. Moreover, the extensive form game models for each strategic option are 
presented in this chapter with the explanations of the components of the models.  
Fourthly, the solutions and interpretations of the models are presented. The 
game-theoretic models are solved through backwards induction technique and these 
solutions are interpreted in conjunction with the discussion in the literature.  
Finally, in the conclusion chapter, the whole thesis is summarized. The main 
findings of the analyses and their political implications to Iran, Israel and the other 
actors of the case (P5+1) are discussed. Moreover, contributions of this thesis to the 
literature and how it can pave the way for some future researches are mentioned at 
the end.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
ISRAELAND IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
 
 
2.1. Steps in the Evolution of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
When Iran signed a cooperation agreement with the United States about 
peaceful nuclear researches in 1957, and established its first thermal reactor again 
with the assistance of the United States in 1967; it was one of the essential allies of 
the Western bloc in the Middle East(Albright, 2005: 49). Even during the 1970s, it 
signed numerous cooperation agreements with not only the U.S. but also some 
companies from Europe (e.g. French and German companies which provide technical 
assistance to Iran) (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014). Moreover, Iran is a member of 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1959 and a party of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1968 (Albright, 2005: 49). In addition to the 
cooperation with the Western states, Iran also sought different channels to improve 
its nuclear capacity. For instance, Iran had some agreements with South Africa for 
uranium enrichment and sent some Iranian scientists to training programs abroad 
(Albright, Shire, Brannan, 2009: 1).  
Interestingly, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi declared Iran’s desire for a 
Middle East nuclear weapon free zone in 1974 which has been maintained as an 
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important part of the Islamic regime’s rhetoric (Bahgat, 2006: 309). Thus, on one 
hand, Iran was making an effort to develop its nuclear capacity; on the other hand, 
the official discourse was based upon a Middle East free from nuclear weapons 
during the 1970s. 
However, the 1979 Islamic revolution was the first breaking point in Iran’s 
nuclear history. Even though the Islamic regime paused the nuclear program due to 
the Islamic precepts in the early years of the revolution, the program was resumed 
during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) through which Iran recognized how it is 
vulnerable against weapons of mass destruction and how the international society is 
incapable (or reluctant) to provide protection in such cases. Another important result 
of the Islamic revolution was that the U.S. repealed all the nuclear agreements with 
Iran after the hostage crisis in 1979. Therefore, Iran was no longer an ally and, even 
worse, was a new and influential enemy in the region.   
As mentioned above, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran restarted the nuclear 
program and replaced the Western support with new alliances, such as with Pakistan 
(1987), China (1990) and the Russia (1992). In particular, Iran had received 
significant support- both technical and political- from the Soviet Union (Russia) and 
China during the 1990s (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014). 
The second breaking point of Iran’s nuclear history was the revelation of its 
undeclared uranium enrichment facilities in 2002 which increased the international 
pressure on Iran. In 2003, the EU-3 (three powerful states of the European Union: 
United Kingdom, France and Germany) played an important role through its 
diplomatic attempts. It made effort to dissuade Iran from the nuclear program in 
return for some incentives by the Western States addressing Iran’s reasons the for 
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nuclear program (Albright, 2005: 51). Iran, in response, signed the additional 
protocol of NPT in 2003 which prescribes stricter IAEA inspections. More 
importantly, in 2004, Iran accepted the suspension (not a permanent end) of its 
uranium enrichment activities by the virtue of the EU-3’s pressure. However, Iran 
clearly informed the EU-3 that it would not accept any demand for a permanent 
cancellation of its nuclear program. Even though the EU-3 initially assured Iran that 
it is not pursuing such a goal, it violated this commitment and asked Iranian 
negotiators to permanently cancel their nuclear program. Iran, which considers the 
nuclear program as an incontestable right, unsurprisingly, ended the negotiations in 
response to this demand and resumed its nuclear program again in 2005 (Mousavian, 
2006: 77).   
When the IAEA reported Iran to the UN Security Council in 2006, Iran 
suspended the implementation of the Additional Protocol of NPT and took a more 
aggressive stance. While the U.S. declared that any agreement that prescribes the 
continuation of Iran’s nuclear program in anyway is not acceptable, Iran announced 
that it succeeded in enriching uranium and will continue until the industrial-scale 
enrichment level. This situation was a declaration of that Iran became one of the 
countries which have nuclear technology (BBC News 2006).  
A similar process to one initiated by the EU-3 in 2003 has restarted currently, 
by the virtue of the recent elections in Iran which resulted with the victory of 
Rouhani, the most moderate candidate approved by the regime. Firstly, Rouhani’s 
article, which is published at the Washington Post in September, gave hope to the 
international public for a new détente period. In the article, Rouhani(2013a) states 
that: 
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...win-win outcomes are not just favorable but also achievable. A 
zero-sum, Cold War mentality leads to everyone’s loss… Rather 
than focusing on how to prevent things from getting worse, we 
need to think — and talk — about how to make things better. To do 
that, we all need to muster the courage to start conveying what we 
want — clearly, concisely and sincerely — and to back it up with 
the political will to take necessary action. This is the essence of my 
approach to constructive interaction. 
 
Following this article, he kept this tone in his speech at the United Nations 
General Assembly in the same month. Moreover, Rouhani and Obama had a phone 
conversation before Rouhani’s leave from the New York which is the first direct 
communication between two states’ president since 1979.     
In this positive political climate, the Geneva talks started between the P5 + 1 
(EU3 + 3) and Iran in October 2013. This negotiation process had a great success in 
November when the sides agreed on a “Joint Plan of Action” that can be considered 
as the first step of a further comprehensive and permanent solution. According to this 
plan, basically, Iran will slow down its nuclear activities and accept more enhanced 
monitoring; while the P5+1 will relief the sanctions gradually and not add new ones 
(Joint Action Plan 2013). While this deal is embraced as a “historic deal” by most of 
the actors; Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, described it as a “historic mistake” and 
added that “Iran is committed to Israel’s destruction, and Israel has the right and the 
obligation to defend itself by itself against any threat. I want to make clear as the 
prime minister of Israel; Israel will not allow Iran to develop a military nuclear 
capability.” (Jerusalem Post, 2013). Consequently, Israel does not tend to be a part of 
this accord, but wants the international community to share Israel’s threat 
perceptions regarding the Iranian regime.  
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2.2. Future of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
Even though there is no certain evidence that Iran has a secret agenda to 
develop nuclear weapon, there are different perspectives in the literature on this issue 
which actually affect the counter-strategy perspectives of the politicians and scholars. 
It was sixteen years ago when Koch and Wolf explained the findings of their analysis 
of the Iranian nuclear capacity which pointed out that it is not possible for Iran to 
have a nuclear weapon capacity for at least 10 to 15 years, technically (1997: 133). 
Thus, it is reasonable to discuss this possibility today, even though the Iranian regime 
denies that and there are substantial counter-arguments.  
On the other hand, through his analysis of the strategic environment of Iran, 
Chubin claims that Iran’s security strategy does not require a nuclear weapons 
capacity since it would not be willing to pay the cost of a possible nuclear weapon 
capacity which would probably remain as a useless and inflexible military tool 
(2001: 33). This assumption is also mentioned by the Iran’s President Hassan 
Rouhani in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 2013. He said “Nuclear 
weapon and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran's security and 
defense doctrine, and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical 
convictions”(Rouhani, 2013b: 5). Despite this clear official statement, on the other 
hand, Sagan and Waltz asserts that the U.S.’s active presence in the region replaced 
the other threats from within the region against Iran, such as Saddam’s Iraq. 
Therefore, Iran would attempt to defend itself, even by venturing the nuclear 
armament, if necessary (Sagan, 2006: 55; Waltz, 2007: 137).  
Finally, differently from these arguments which presume that Iran would 
certainly succeed in developing nuclear weapons if it decides to do and the outside 
powers do not prevent, Hymans claims that Iran’s nuclear program is likely to fail 
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itself due to inappropriate scientific and managerial process it involves (2012: 87). 
Moreover, external interceptions can only motivate the dysfunctional Iranian 
bureaucracy and scientific team which would fail on their own, he argues (2012: 96). 
Nevertheless, despite denial of the Iranian officials, most of the diplomatic 
efforts and academic studies tend to assume that Iran might have a secret agenda for 
nuclear armament and it is certainly able to develop nuclear weapons without an 
external prevention. Thus, the debates concentrated on the possible counter-strategies 
against this possibility. 
 
2.3. Threat Perceptions of Israel Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program 
Based upon the assumption that Iran’s nuclear program will end up with a 
nuclear weapon capacity, the basic threat perception of Israel is a direct nuclear 
strike by Iran (Greenblum, 2006: 78; Weiss, 2009: 81; Sadr, 2005: 5). Secondly, if 
Iran has nuclear weapons capacity, it can transfer these nuclear warheads to the 
terrorist organizations (such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad) which have been fighting 
against Israel for a long time. This option would also have some catastrophic results 
for Israel (Sadr, 2005:8). Thirdly, nuclear weapons capability would provide 
impunity to Iran while sponsoring radical Islamist terrorist organizations. In other 
words, even if Iran does not transfer nuclear weapons to these terrorist organizations, 
a nuclear umbrella would reduce Iran’s fear of a counter-attack by Israel in response 
to terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran (Sadr, 2005: 9; Greenblum, 2006: 80). Fourth, a 
nuclear-Iran might start a nuclear proliferation process in the Middle East which 
would end up with more nuclear enemies for Israel. Additionally, conventional arms 
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race can accelerate within the region which would mean more military spending, and 
so economic problems for Israel (Sadr, 2005: 12).  
Apart from these threat perceptions, Weiss(2009: 81) points out a different 
reference object which is also under threat by Iran’s nuclear program: the Zionist 
project. This project aims to strength democratic Jewish state through the 
immigration of the Jews all over the world to Israel. Accordingly, he asserts that the 
Iran’s nuclear program, even without a nuclear strike, can easily undermine the 
Zionist project by dissuading Jews from immigration to Israel because of the fear of 
a possible nuclear-armed Iran (Weiss, 2009: 82). Thus, the threat perception of Israel 
is based on not only existential concerns but also some future anxieties.  
Even though all of these threats seem reasonable, there are some arguments 
that point out the other side of the coin. Firstly, it is not plausible to presume that the 
Iranian decision-makers are not so radical who would neglect the unavoidable results 
of a nuclear strike to Israel. Iran’s non-democratic regime does not necessarily mean 
that they are irrational and they would act according to their ideological precepts at 
any cost. Quite the contrary, since the Islamic revolution, the Iranian decision makers 
have been relying on pragmatism for the sake of the regime survival and they realize 
that an attack to Israel would receive a great retaliation which could annihilate the 
regime (Bergman, 2009: 171). Moreover, some analysts argue, no state can be sure 
that the nuclear weapons, which they transferred to terrorist organizations, will be 
used as desired by the supplier. Even Iran, as a state which uses proxy war 
deliberately, would not willing to take such a risk (Sadr, 2005: 12; Weiss, 2009: 79). 
Therefore, it is possible to claim that the existential threat perception of the Israeli 
policy makers lacks a strong ground.  
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2.4. Theoretical Discussion: Controlling, Coercion, Reassurance and 
Combination of Deterrence and Reassurance 
Before the discussion of the Israel’s strategy in response to Iran’s nuclear 
program specifically, it would be helpful to evaluate each strategic option 
theoretically and answer some key questions: What are these strategies? How do we 
distinguish them?  How did they evolve theoretically? What are their advantages and 
limitations? 
  
2.4.1. Controlling 
Freedman(2004: 26) distinguishes the basic strategies of conflict as 
consensual, coercive and controlling strategies. Even though the coercion and 
controlling strategies are mostly used interchangeably, they have clear boundaries as 
distinct strategic alternatives. Thus, it is important to clarify what is not “coercion” 
before going into details of the coercion debate in the literature. Consensual strategy 
is “the adjustment of strategic choices with others without the threat or use of force” 
which would probably be the most desired way of resolving international crisis 
(Freedman, 2004: 26). Yet, since reassurance strategies, as a kind of consensual 
strategy, will be discussed later in this chapter, the distinction between the more 
common strategies -controlling and coercion- will be made clear initially.  
Controlling strategy basically refers to goal-oriented use of force in order to 
eliminate the adversary’s strategic choices rather than to influence them. In other 
words, the crucial distinction is that the controlling strategy prescribes use of force 
and directly limits the adversary’s options while coercion leaves the adversary a 
capacity to make a choice between the options and it attempts to influence this 
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choice through the explicit threats of use of force (Freedman, 2004: 26). For 
instance, when the U.S. realized that Saddam was not a deterrable actor due to its 
irrational decision making record, threatening Saddam and waiting for his 
compliance (coercion strategy) was not a wise strategy. Thus, changing the regime in 
Iraq, which was a controlling strategy in the sense of eliminating target’s options, 
was employed by the U.S government (Freedman, 2004: 100).   
The different forms of the controlling strategy may help better to grasp the 
underlying idea. Freedman asserts that the preventive and pre-emptive wars, which 
have been used interchangeably again, are both in the scope of the controlling 
strategy since they aim to decrease the likelihood of an imminent threat through 
reducing or removing the target’s capacity to pose that threat (Freedman, 2004). 
More specifically, when a state realizes that the other one is improving its capacity 
that would alter the power balance between them it may decide to prevent this 
through a “preventive war”. This preventive war might carry out the goal of 
disarming the opponent or changing its political character (and so make sure that it is 
no longer a threat notwithstanding its capacity) (Freedman, 2004: 85). Differently, if 
the preventive war has not been preferred initially and the opponent succeed in 
improving its capacity significantly, then, the former may decide to attack before 
being attacked by its rising opponent, and this war is labeled as  “pre-emptive war” 
(or “anticipatory self- defense” by the international lawyers) (Freedman, 2004: 86). 
So, the pre-emptive action takes place between the possession of the capacity by the 
opponent and the decision of using this capacity. Both of preventive and pre-emptive 
actions are consistent with the controlling strategy’s framework since they include 
use of force and aim to remove adversary’s strategic choices.  
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The Cold War context may well present how these strategies function at 
different stages of an enduring rivalry. Until 1957, preventive war had been an option 
for the U.S in the sense of preventing the Soviets Union from acquiring nuclear 
weapons capacity and shifting the balance of power. However, the U.S allowed the 
Soviets Union to have nuclear power, since the risks of a preventive action were 
unacceptably high. After 1957, when the Soviets Union launched the Sputnik 
satellite that indicated the capacity to send intercontinental ballistic missiles, and so 
the U.S lost its superiority against the Soviet Union, the option on the table was a 
pre-emptive action that would eliminate the Soviets’ nuclear capacity before they are 
used against the U.S. Yet, the risk was that if the Soviets Union absorbs the pre-
emptive action and retains even a small nuclear capacity (second strike capability); it 
would have catastrophic results for the U.S. (Freedman, 2004: 87, 88). Therefore, 
these two actions separately relevant at the different stages of a crisis and they are 
out of the scope of deterrence strategy since they contain the use of force and deny 
the opponent’s capacity to make a choice among options. Also it should be noted that 
the controlling strategy, in general terms, is different from a basic military strike 
because of its limited and purposeful nature which directly targets the opponent’s 
options regarding a specific issue.   
However, both of them have limitations. For the pre-emptive action, it is 
generally an assumption that the rising opponent would attack and it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to have convincing evidences for this assumption. On the other hand, 
insufficient justification of a preventive attack-which is often the case- would result 
with an isolation from the international community or formation of a new alliance 
network among potential targets which are concerned and provoked by this 
preventive action.  
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2.4.2. Coercion: Deterrence & Compellence 
Coercion, as an alternative strategy, can be described as “deliberate and 
purposive use of overt threats of force to influence another’s strategic choices” 
(Freedman and Raghavan, 2013: 207). It can be divided to two branches as 
deterrence and compellence. While “deterrence” coerces the adversary to refrain 
from acting, “compellence” aims to make the adversary undertake an action (Schaub, 
2004: 389). In other words, deterrence demands inaction whereas compellence 
demands action (Freedman, 1998: 19). In addition to the nature of demand, Schelling 
asserts that the difference between them lies in the timing and initiative (1966: 69). 
In deterrence, there is no strict time limit as we threaten the opponent to refrain and 
wait for its compliance, “preferably forever-that’s our purpose”. In compellence, in 
contrast, there must be a clear deadline after which the punishment will be 
implemented unless the opponent acts in the desired way. Secondly, in deterrence, 
the decisive initiative is up to the opponent whether it will comply or defy the threat. 
Compellence, on the other hand, involves “initiating an action (or an irrevocable 
commitment to action) that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent 
responds” (Schelling, 1966: 72). Thus, there is a consensus on that compellence is 
more difficult to achieve than deterrence since it requires a clear deadline, a strong 
initiative and causes an overt humiliation for the compelled actor.  
 However, the prospect theory attributes this relative difficulty to 
different reasons. The expected utility theory differentiate the difficulty levels of the 
deterrence and compellence only if some external factors, such as the 
audience/prestige effect, the possibility of further demands and the costly changes in 
the status-quo, come into play which are very difficult to measure systematically. 
However, according to prospect theory, Levy (1992) states that the actors are more 
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willing to take risk in order to defend their reference points when they feel 
themselves in the domain of losses. Thus, it becomes “easier to deter an adversary 
from initiating an action she has not yet taken than to compel her to undo what she 
has already done or to undertake actions which she would prefer not to do’’ (Levy, 
1992: 290). It means that the prospect theory attributes the relative easiness of the 
deterrence to endogenous factors (Schaub, 2004). As Schaub states, “prospect theory 
suggests that a decision- maker will value losses more than gains even if they are 
essentially equivalent”. (Schaub, 2004: 400). Therefore, the adversary faces with a 
certain loss in compellence case whereas it contemplates giving up a possible gain in 
deterrence case (Schaub, 2004: 392). The policy implication is that when the 
exogenous conditions are equal for both situations, the adversary’s compliance in a 
deterrence situation is more likely compared to a compellence situation, according to 
prospect theory (Schaub, 2004: 402).
1
 
Nevertheless, even though Schelling (1969: 79) attempts to differentiate the 
defensive and offensive motives in a strategy and so presented “compellence” as a 
different concept that represent offensive motives, the distinction between neither 
defense and offense, nor deterrence and compellence works in practice. Particularly, 
“when the attempt is made to deter continuance of something the opponent is already 
doing”, the boundary between deterrence and compellence get blurred (Freedman, 
1998: 19). Therefore, the deterrence debate below also relevant for such combined 
situations, and the specific complications for compellence will be neglected for the 
sake of clarity.  
                                                          
1
For a detailed discussion of the prospect theory in international relations see: Levy, J. S. 1997. 
Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations. International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1), 
pp. 87-112; Levy, J. S. 1996. Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining: The implications of prospect 
theory for international conflict. International Political Science Review, 17 (2), pp. 179-195; Farnham, 
B. 1994. Avoiding losses / taking risks. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Mcdermott, R. 1992. 
Prospect theory in international relations: The Iranian hostage rescue mission. Political Psychology, 
pp. 237-263. 
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2.4.2.1. Deterrence 
The idea of deterrence seems quite simple, as Morgan states, “people dislike 
harm, so they shy away from actions which promise harm” (Morgan, 1977: 17). In 
strategic terms, a rational actor can prevent a certain action through a credible threat 
that would affect the cost-benefit calculus of a rational opponent. However, such a 
description is quite restrictive and does not represent all the aspects. The definition 
that deterrence refers to action that “seeks to prevent an undesired action by 
convincing the party who may be contemplating such action that its cost will exceed 
any possible gain” is more comprehensive and more consistent, since it does not 
restrain the “undesired action” as only a military attack by the opponent, or not solely 
mention the threats as the way of convincing the opponent (Stein, 1991: 432). Yet, 
the issue is getting more complicated when we scrutinize the each elements of 
deterrence strategy. 
 Even though the classical deterrence theory (rational deterrence theory) has 
the assumption of rationality for all actors in a deterrent relationship, the 
characteristic and different motives of an opponent or different understandings of 
rationality by the actors may impede such an assumption. Moreover, 
Freedman(2004: 28) asserts that even if the same conceptualization of the rationality 
is shared by the actors, misperception or misinterpretation of the threats can still pose 
problems for the strategy. Also, there is no consensus on whether threats and 
punishments or positive inducements or a combination of them are more effective. 
Even if we accept the conventional wisdom that the threats are the main instruments 
of a deterrence strategy, it is not clear what makes a threat effective and credible. 
Thus, the tactics and the methods to convince the opponent to comply are also 
problematic. Furthermore, the difficulties to measure the success of deterrence also a 
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well discussed issue in the literature. It is widely accepted that it is obvious when a 
deterrent threat fails, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to be certain that the 
deterrence is the key of success when an opponent refrains from an undesired action, 
since numerous factors come into play in such decision making processes. Therefore, 
deterrence is not a simple and smooth strategy of conflict both in theory and practice.  
However, before continuing this discussion with more details, the different types of 
deterrence should be noted briefly here, since each of them has a different place in 
this discussion. 
 
2.4.2.1.1. Classifications of Deterrence Strategy 
     There are a few classifications of deterrence due to different aspects of the 
strategy, such as scale of confrontation (general&immediate deterrence), nature of 
the relationship between parties (central&extended deterrence, unilateral&mutual 
deterrence), construction and nature of threats (conventional&nuclear deterrence, 
deterrence by denial&punishment). Each of these categories will be defined briefly 
here, since they will also be discussed further in this chapter. 
a) General and Immediate Deterrence 
 Immediate deterrence refers to cases in which the defender forecasts a 
challenge by the initiator and tries to deter him by denial or punishment whereas 
general deterrence is embedded in the existing power relations which functions 
through dissuading the initiator from even thinking of use of force (Stein, 1991: 432). 
Therefore, the immediate deterrence exists only if the general deterrence fails. 
Morgan (1977: 36) presents four conditions that indicate the immediate deterrence: 
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 In a relationship between two hostile states the officials in at 
least one of them are seriously considering attacking the other 
or attacking some are of the world the other deems important. 
 Key officials of the other states realize this. 
 Realizing that an attack is a distinct possibility, the latter set of 
official threaten the use of force in retaliation in attempt to 
prevent attack 
 Leaders of the state planning to attack decide to desist primarily 
because of the retaliatory threat(s). 
 
When compared these two types, the general deterrence is more common 
compared to immediate deterrence, while most of the analyses and wisdom based 
upon the immediate deterrence’s framework (Morgan 1977: 29). It is mostly because 
of the difficulty to substantiate general deterrence’s influence on the decisions of 
actors (Huth & Russett, 1984: 497). Nevertheless, Quackenbush argues, as the 
existence of immediate deterrence indicates the failure of general deterrence, it is 
more significant to examine the general deterrence cases to understand the dynamics 
of international conflicts (2010: 61).  
b) Central (Direct) and Extended Deterrence   
Another categorization of deterrence is about the nature of the relationship 
between the actors. If the relationship consists only two actors and one of them 
attempts to deter other in order to protect its own interests, we can label this strategy 
as central (direct) deterrence. Extended deterrence, on the other hand, refers to cases 
in which an actor employs the deterrence strategy to deter a challenger in order to 
protect an ally (protégé) (Huth, 1988: 16). The situation gets more complicated 
compared to direct deterrence, because the capacity of the protégé or the relationship 
between the deterrer and protégé may also affect the success or failure of the 
strategy. 
c) Unilateral & Mutual Deterrence 
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If we consider the deterrence as a strategy to prevent an actor that challenges 
the status-quo, there is no deterrent relationship when none of the actors effort to 
alter the status-quo. In this sense, unilateral deterrence refers to situations in which 
only one side challenge the status-quo and the other attempts to deter, whereas 
mutual deterrence refers two actors’ reciprocal efforts to both challenge status-quo 
and deter each other (Quackenbush, 2011: 750). The relationship between the U.S 
and the Soviets Union during the Cold War is the best example of such a mutual 
deterrent relationship in which both of them assumed that the other one was trying to 
alter the status-quo and it has to preserve the status-quo through deterrence. Although 
it can be argued that the status-quo is a subjective concept, and therefore the roles of 
“defender” and “challenger” cannot constantly and objectively assigned to parties, 
this issue will discussed later as it is relevant to other types of  deterrence too. 
d) Conventional & Nuclear Deterrence 
The mutual deterrent relationship between the U.S and the Soviets Union 
during the Cold War has another important aspect regarding the nature of threats that 
based upon. Since both superpowers in the Cold War had nuclear weapons, their 
deterrent relationship had different dynamics compared to others that based on 
conventional weapons. Most importantly, it was assumed that the nuclear weapons 
technology provided mutual destructive capacities to both the U.S and the Soviets 
Union during Cold War and due to the unacceptable costs of a nuclear attack (mutual 
assured destruction) neither side attempted to initiate a conflict. In other words, the 
higher destructive capacities they had, the less likely they considered attacking the 
other. Accordingly, Waltz argued that the destructive capacities of weapons of mass 
destruction would bring stability to international system, and so the proliferation of 
WMDs should be encouraged (Sagan, Waltz, Betts, 2007:147).    
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However, this approach received some critiques. For instance, there was no 
clear evidence that the nuclear deterrence, as a deliberate and purposeful strategy, 
was the factor that prevented a catastrophic superpower war (Freedman, 1998: 25). 
Moreover, according to perfect deterrence theory which argues that only rational 
threats can be credible, even WMDs (including nuclear weapons) themselves are not 
rational threats since the target would already know that the deterrer cannot carries 
out such self-destructive threat and so the strategy would fail automatically (Zagare, 
2000: 289). These critiques do not only target the “nuclear” deterrence, so they will 
be discussed later. 
e)  Deterrence by denial & punishment 
The conventional wisdom of deterrence relies upon deterrence by 
punishment. It is widely accepted that a credible deterrent threat can only be built 
upon punishment that would inflict high costs to opponent. However, such a 
conceptualization is deficient and restrictive in the sense of addressing only one 
aspect of the opponent’s cost-benefit calculus as Synder argues (cited in Freedman & 
Raghavan, 2013: 211). Thus, it is also possible to construct a deterrence strategy 
through defensive measures. To put it simply, deterrence by denial is an attempt to 
deny a possible attack through strengthening own defensive measures and so 
increasing the cost for the opponent if it considers attacking. In Freedman’s words, 
“If moving forward is going to be extremely difficult because of obstacles placed 
directly in one’s path then the costs overcoming these obstacles- in the form of more 
troops, better equipment, more robust supply lines- will intermingle in one’s mind 
with costs resulting from the opponent’s retaliation.” (Freedman, 1998: 26, 27). More 
specifically, it can be achieved through passive defense (ex. shelters in homeland) or 
active defense (anti-ballistic missile systems), although the blurred distinction 
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between offense and defense again problematize such conceptualizations (Freedman, 
2004: 37).   
Even though the idea of deterrence by denial is harshly criticized because it 
contradicts with the nature of strategy, Freedman claims that the deterrence by denial 
is inherently more reliable, because if implementation of threats becomes necessary, 
it offers a certain control rather than to continue coercion in which the target still has 
choices and can defy (Freedman, 2004: 39). Therefore, when we considered the goal 
of deterrence strategy as influencing the calculus of a challenger and manipulating its 
choices, deterrence by denial remains as a strong alternative to punishment.  
 
2.4.2.1.2. Four Waves of Deterrence Theory 
The history of deterrence theory is divided into three waves by Jervis (1979). 
He asserts that the first wave started with writings of Brodie, Wolfers and Viner 
(cited in Jervis, 1979: 291) at the early years of the nuclear era, but this wave lacked 
a systemized framework and  remained as immature until the second wave in 1950s 
and 1960s. The second wave established the general framework of deterrence theory 
by relying upon a game theoretical model, game of Chicken in which “each side tries 
to prevail by making the other think it is going to stand firm” (Jervis,1979: 291). This 
modelling helped to understand the contexts and nature of the international crises. 
Even though the traditional definition of deterrence- using threats to manipulate the 
behaviors of the opponent- was shaped during this wave, however, there are 
numerous critiques against this wave.  
Firstly, the second wave deterrence theorists focused on getting best possible 
payoff from the crisis while no attention paid how to transform hostile relations to 
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the peaceful ones. However, it is argued by the second wave theorists that explaining 
all of the dynamics of international conflicts in such a broader manner has never 
been the goal of deterrence theory. Thus, they emphasized the need for parsimony in 
response this critique. This focus limited the scope of the theory, although did not 
damage its validity (Jervis, 1979: 292).  
Secondly, it relied upon the role of threats to manipulate the opponent, but 
ignored the role of “compromise and rewards” that would be more efficient than 
threats (Jervis, 1979: 294). George’s concept of “coercive diplomacy” addressed and 
attempted to fill this gap in deterrence theory. He suggests using positive 
inducements along with punitive threats in order to convince an adversary to “stop 
and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon” (George, 1991: 5). Coercive 
diplomacy is distinguished form deterrence since it targets an action that is already 
undertaken and also from compellence as it differentiates the offensive and defensive 
threats and is not limited to coercive threats. Therefore, George (1991:5) represents 
the coercive diplomacy as an “alternative to reliance on military action” and as a 
third form of coercion, in contrast to Schelling’s classification. 
 Thirdly, the second wave deterrence theory was ethnocentric in the sense of 
basing upon in the Western culture, while different actors may read the world and 
events differently due to their own cultures (Jervis, 1979: 296). Thus, this 
ethnocentric approach would undermine efforts to construct a general theory of 
deterrence and leads us to rely on more context-dependent strategies as George 
suggests (1991: 69). The concept of “tailored deterrence” can be considered as an 
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effort to refine this aspect currently, but it will not be discussed here since it lacks a 
well-developed framework and out of the scope of this research.
2
 
Lastly, the pure rationality assumption of the second wave is criticized for 
neglecting the room for irrational decision-makings in crises times. As emotional or 
mindless reactions, misperception, and misinterpretation are highly probable during 
an intense crisis time, it would not be wise to assume a pure rationality for actors 
(Jervis, 1979: 299; George, 1991: 4). Morgan(1977:13) states that “Deterrence theory 
takes threat and reaction, a complex psychological phenomenon with obvious 
emotional equipment of man, and reduces it to the interaction of a set of rational 
decision makers.”. The problematic nature of the rationality understanding of the 
second wave is not limited with the complications during the crisis time, yet it will 
be discussed later with the perfect deterrence theory’s arguments. 
The third wave of deterrence theory firstly focused on the empirical studies 
that attempted to test the theory, provide evidences and answer the main question: 
under which conditions the deterrence strategy succeeds and when it fails (Jervis, 
1979: 303). The most comprehensive empirical research is led by Huth and Russett 
(1984) in which they examined fifty four cases that involved immediate-extended 
deterrence strategy. They argue that the characteristic of the tie between the defender 
and protégé is a more decisive factor than the relative military balance between the 
defender and challenger (Huth and Russett, 1984: 497). More specifically, it is 
concluded that “deterrence is more likely to be effective, the greater the defender’s 
visible and symbolic stake in the protégé” (Huth and Russett, 1984: 516). Another 
important conclusion of the research is that the previous crisis behaviors of the 
                                                          
2
 For a recent discussion of the role of strategic culture and need for “tailored deterrence” see: 
Lantis, J. S. 2009. Strategic culture and tailored deterrence: bridging the gap between theory and 
practice. Contemporary Security Policy, 30 (3), pp. 467--485. 
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deterrer do not significantly decrease the likelihood of success in further cases, 
contrary to conventional wisdom (Huth and Russett, 1984:517). In other words, an 
actor may take step backward in a confrontation in which its “stake in the protégé” is 
not sufficiently high, but it can stand firm in another confrontation if its interest 
regarding the protégé are vital.  
However, this empirical research is criticized in many respects. First of all, 
according to the analysis of the same cases by Lebow and Stein(1990: 337), most of 
them even do not include the strategy of deterrence since the basic elements of a 
deterrence strategy, such as existence of a challenger with a serious intention to 
attack, lack. They defend more rigorous definition of the deterrence, strict 
application of this definition to the empirical cases and strong evidences that indicate 
the existence of deterrence in those cases. Moreover, Lebow and Stein(1990: 345) 
stress the difficulty of evaluating success and failure of deterrence in empirical 
studies and assert that if there is no clear evidence that the challenger’s decision to 
concede is mainly because of the defender’s threat, then it is not plausible to make a 
judgment about the success or failure of deterrence. When it is considered that there 
are numerous economic or political factors that can lead the defender to that 
decision, absence of strong evidence may lead observer to a subjective analysis. 
Therefore, they are skeptical about the validity of not only Huth and Russett’s (1984) 
analysis, but all “the context-free criteria” of deterrence in general terms because of 
the existence of “subjectivity in the selecting and coding of deterrence cases” 
(Lebow and Stein, 1990: 353). 
 On the other hand, Huth and Russett (1990: 468) argue that these critiques 
are misleading since Lebow and Stein (1990) misunderstand the conceptualization 
and operationalization in the mentioned research. For instance, they accept that some 
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economic and political conditions-outside the scope of deterrence theory- may shape 
the defender’s decision and even they can dominate the cost-benefit calculus of the 
defender, but empirical studies can still explore “relative explanatory power of 
variables within and outside the scope of deterrence theory” by addressing their 
effects (Huth and Russett, 1990: 470,471). Moreover, in response to requirement of 
strong evidences for the intentions of a defender, it is argued that even the “strong 
evidences” suggestes by Lebow and Stein (1990), namely official documentary, may 
be misleading (perhaps intentionally) or even the actor itself may not be sure about 
its own intention or its intention can change during the crisis (Huth and Russett, 
1990: 481). Additionally, even if the documentary evidence is used for the evaluation 
of the success or failure of deterrence, it would also be misleading as policy makers 
hardly accept that they are deterred due to their motive to protect their reputation 
(Huth and Russett, 1990: 491). Actually, it is does not undermine Lebow and Stein’s 
concerns regarding the difficulty of understanding the actors’ intentions, but 
supports. Nevertheless, Huth and Russett(1990:489) claim that insisting on strong 
and clear evidence-based on official documents- may lead researchers to exclude 
“many cases of legitimate deterrence”, and so it becomes a “greater bias” than using 
the available evidences to indicate the existence of a defender, its intentions and the 
success or failure of deterrence strategy.                  
Another focal point of the third wave theorists was the role of interests in a 
bargaining situation. Jervis(1979: 314) distinguishes two kinds of interests which are 
the “intrinsic interest” that refers to “inherent value the actor places on the object or 
issue at stake”; and the “strategic interest” represents “the degree to which a retreat 
would endanger the state’s position on other issues…”. The implication of this 
distinction for deterrence theory is that the intrinsic interest is more essential for the 
28 
 
success of deterrence. In other words, the side that has more vital interest obviously 
is more likely to deter other successfully. George(1991: 77) conceptualizes this as 
“asymmetry of motivation” and claims that if one side can create this in a bargaining 
situation, it can increase the probability of successful deterrence.Accordingly, 
asymmetry of motivation can be obtained in two ways; first, it would be aimed to 
protect only the own vital interests and not to damage the other side’s vital interests, 
or, positive inducements may be utilized to reduce the opponent’s “motivation to 
resist the demands” (George, 1991: 77). Moreover, the greater intrinsic interest 
would bring an inherent and powerful credibility, and so decrease the need for costly 
commitments (Jervis, 1979:316). The most important implication of this argument is 
that the overestimation of the role of commitment misleads us to think that the 
decisions in different crises are interdependent and so each retreats/victories affects 
the further one (Jervis, 1979:319). However, as the essential factor is the asymmetry 
of motivation, the only plausible conclusion would be that an actor can examine the 
previous behaviors of its opponent to infer that whether it is likely or not to stand 
firm in the current crisis.       
In addition to the points mentioned above, there are some views that are 
skeptical about whether the deterrence strategy is a promising way of managing 
crisis or not. Although there is variety of criteria for a successful deterrence, such as 
clarity of the defenders’ goal, credibility of the threat or a healthy communication 
between actors and it is reasonable to expect a successful deterrence when these 
basic conditions exist;, the process is not that smooth (Mazarr and Goodby, 2011: 
58). Firstly, deterrence does not always work against all the actors. Schelling 
emphasizes the initiator’s mind and states that some “…mad-men, like small 
children, can often not be controlled by threats” (Schelling, 1960: 6). In conjunction 
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with this, Lebow and Stein(1989: 213) assert that when a determined initiator is 
combined with misperception or miscalculation, the outcome of deterrence strategy 
becomes quite ambiguous. Thus, it is fair to claim that politicians or leaders cannot 
rely upon deterrence theory because it is not able to predict the outcome correctly in 
general and might have unexpected implications. 
Lebow and Stein(1989: 220) also state that deterrence fails in most of the 
empirical tests, because the initiators’ calculations shaped by the factors outside the 
realm of deterrence theory. Moreover, Morgan claims that the factors related to 
nature of the threat or communication level between the actors present only one 
dimension of the issue. He points out the “domestic political processes” and 
“leadership factor” which shape the decision making context of the target actor, such 
as personality of the leaders or bureaucratic structure (Morgan, 1977: 147). Also, 
when policymakers believe that a challenge is needed to compensate the crucial 
needs, even overt and credible threats are not able to deter them because most of the 
variables mentioned above are not open to manipulation from outside (Lebow, 1983: 
334). Thus, it can be inferred that since deterrence does not address the underlying 
roots of aggression, it is less than a satisfactory way of managing international 
confrontations (Lebow, 1983: 345). 
Differently from Lebow and Stein, MccGwire(1986: 64) points out the 
problematic nature of deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, itself. According to 
him, the deterrence-based policy of the U.S. was perceived as a security threat by the 
Soviet Union and drove them to take countermeasures during the Cold War. 
Therefore, deterrence was the main reason of the security problems and attempts to 
avoid intransigencies, rather than seeking for best ways of managing them, can serve 
actors interests and security better.  
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Even though the classical deterrence theory mostly deals with the Cold War 
context and the validity of the deterrence strategy has been questioned after the end 
of the Cold War, the deterrence theory literature keeps expanding in different 
directions currently. The most significant contribution comes from the Zagare and 
Kilgour as they introduced the perfect deterrence theory which aims to overcome the 
limitations of the rational deterrence theory, reconcile rationality and deterrence and 
reinforce the explanatory power of the deterrence theory. The perfect deterrence 
theory firstly points out that how the classical/rational deterrence theory is logically 
inconsistent and empirically implausible (Zagare&Kilgour, 2000: 287). For instance, 
the rational deterrence mostly relied upon the “unthinkable wars” due to nuclear 
capacities of the superpowers, however the nuclear weapons are irrational threats 
since they can never be carried out and the adversary already knows that. In other 
words, as both sides know that the nuclear war is the worst option in any case, they 
also know that a rational opponent would never use that threat (Zagare, 2004: 118). 
Therefore, how can the rational deterrence theory rely upon irrational threats and 
possibility of irrational behaviors by the rational actors? In addition to this logical 
inconsistency, rational deterrence theory also lacks a consistent explanatory power, 
such as while it explains the absence of superpower conflict with the parity 
conditions between the U.S and Soviets Union’s nuclear capacities, it fails to explain 
why there was no war until the Soviets Union achieved the equivalence (Zagare, 
2004: 111). Thus, the perfect deterrence theory attempted to overcome these 
problems within the framework of deterrence theory by changing some of the 
assumptions. 
The most important difference of the perfect deterrence theory is about the 
capability and credibility of the threats in a deterrence strategy. It argues that a 
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capable threat, which is a threat that hurts the opponent, is the only necessary 
condition for the success of deterrence (Zagare&Kilgour, 2000: 290). However, a 
capable threat must be both physically and psychologically capable. Namely, the 
deterrer must have the material capacity to execute the threat and it must be 
perceived by the opponent that the cost inflicted by the threat is higher than the gains 
that can be sought by defying the threat. More specifically, “a threat is capable if 
only the threatened player prefers status-quo to the outcome that results when and if 
the threat is carried out” (Zagare, 2004: 123,124). Although it is a part of 
conventional wisdom, the perfect deterrence theory makes a difference by arguing 
that there are both a minimum threshold that is “a point of minimum cost” necessary 
for deterrence to succeed, and a “maximum threshold” that reflects the point above 
which increasing the cost would no longer increase success probability 
(Zagare&Kilgour, 2000: 292). Therefore, a capable threat is simply the threat that 
exceeds the minimum threshold. Yet, the WMDs those may help to exceed this 
minimum point are favorable as long as they do not exceed the maximum point. The 
most significant policy implications of this argument are that perfect deterrence 
theory sets a theoretical ground for arms control efforts and supports a “minimum 
deterrence policy” rather than increasing overkill capability that would possibly 
backfire (Zagare&Kilgour, 2000: 292). 
Perfect deterrence theory differs from the classical deterrence theory also 
regarding the credibility aspect of deterring threats. It simply argues that the threats 
are credible as long as they are rational to be carried out. Therefore, a nuclear war 
threat, for instance, cannot be considered as credible threat since it is irrational for 
the deterrer to carry out this threat. Secondly, perfect deterrence theory emphasizes 
that credibility of threat is not a necessary condition for deterrence to succeed 
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(Zagare, 2004: 125). Differently from the mainstream deterrence literature, the 
perfect deterrence theory points out the credibility of retaliatory threat by the 
challenger and claims that when it is not credible, it is not able to deter defender from 
carrying out the initial threat or retaliating, and thus challenger is more likely to be 
deterred even without a credible threat by defender (Zagare, 2004: 125). Lastly, the 
credibility perspective of perfect deterrence theory suggests “reciprocity norm” in 
foreign policy making. This norm bases upon the idea that an actor responds the 
other as it is treated by him (Zagare&Kilgour, 2000: 297). In practice, it refers 
“avoiding inflexible hardline policies”, such as irrevocable commitment that is 
suggested by rational deterrence theory, since they would engender negative 
reactions by the other actors. However, it does not suggest cooperating 
unconditionally as “unilateral concessions are generally invitations for exploitation” 
(Zagare, 2004: 136).     
Perfect deterrence theory also evaluates the actors’ approaches to status-quo 
differently. While classical deterrence theorists assume that dissatisfaction with the 
status-quo is constant, perfect deterrence theory differentiate actors’ preferences. 
Therefore, it considers the (dis)satisfaction as a variable, not constant, by arguing 
that some states may be content with the status-quo and some may not (Zagare, 2004: 
127). This changed assumption has a significant implication for deterrence theory 
since it overcomes the limited scope. As mentioned earlier, Lebow and Stein criticize 
the rational deterrence theory for excluding many other variables that possibly affect 
the crisis decision-making of an opponent; and in response, Huth and Russett 
acknowledge these other variables, such as economic and (domestic) political 
conditions, but asserts that they are out of the scope of deterrence theory. In this 
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sense, Zagare argues, perfect deterrence theory makes it possible to include these 
variables which are embedded in the status-quo evaluation of the actors (2000: 295).     
Empirical records, Quackenbush(2010: 62) argues, also support the perfect 
deterrence theory’s theoretical propositions. Most importantly, it presents a 
consistent solution, by reconciling rationality and credibility of threats, to the 
paradox in rational deterrence theory that is relying upon irrational threats to make 
deterrence works between rational actors. Therefore, the cases can be explained more 
properly by this consistent theoretical framework. Quackenbush (2010: 61) argues 
that general deterrence is more essential than immediate deterrence and perfect 
deterrence theory provides a better framework for explaining general deterrence 
situations, and so international conflicts. His statistical analysis of empirical records 
of general deterrence from 1816-2000 concludes that perfect deterrence theory’s 
theoretical approach described above fits better to behaviors of the actors and 
outcomes of the cases (Quackenbush, 2010: 75). Consequently, perfect deterrence 
theory offers a stronger theoretical ground for deterrence theory and paves a better 
way for further research by making deterrence “perfect” in the sense of overcoming 
limitations and avoiding paradoxes.      
Finally, in addition to the “three waves” of Jervis, a fourth wave of deterrence 
theory is on the agenda of deterrence theory recently. It basically aims to address 
“new” asymmetric security threats after the end of the Cold War and points out the 
need for a new conceptualization of deterrence that does not solely rely upon military 
terms (Knopf, 2010: 1). Therefore, the idea is that the target and method of the 
deterrence strategy should be modified to maintain its relevance in the post-Cold 
War context where controlling strategy (particularly pre-emption) is more favorable 
against terrorist organizations or rogue states since they are considered as 
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“undeterrable”. More specifically, it suggests i) relying on deterrence by denial 
particularly against terrorism; ii) including non-military tools, such as deterring 
terrorist organizations by delegitimizing their causes or using counter-narrative to 
balance their propaganda impact; iii) or using deterrence indirectly to deter the third 
parties from supporting terrorist organizations or WMD proliferation (Knopf, 2010: 
25). However, these alternative tactics within the deterrence strategy still lacks a 
well-developed theoretical ground and empirical testing. Moreover, problematic 
definitions of some threats, such as “rogue state” as a much-debated term, would 
undermine a systematic formulation of these strategies.     
On the other hand, Lupovici(2010: 721) presents a constructivist agenda for 
the fourth wave and argues that this constructivist trend can be combined with the 
new empirical efforts mentioned above, even though they are developed separately. 
Firstly, the constructivist approach considers deterrence as a learned phenomenon 
and underlines that learning its practices influences the chance of success. For 
instance, transforming the technological developments, such as nuclear technology, 
to deterrent threats was a learning process during the Cold War and the sides’ ability 
to learn affected their strategies’ successes (Lupovici , 2010: 712,713). Secondly, it 
is argued that deterrence is a social construction in the sense of depending on ideas, 
knowledge and the interpretation of them. Most of the concepts regarding the 
deterrence, such as rationality, threat and security, or credibility are all social 
constructions, and so it is needed to recognize the intersubjective understandings of 
these concepts and the social context in which they take place (Lupovici, 2010: 715, 
716).  
Additionally, the discourses are also crucial in constructivist understanding of 
deterrence as they not only convey the signals but also construct the reality given the 
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identity-discourse relationship. In practices of deterrence, actors’ self-perceptions as 
“defender” or “challenger” (role identities), their stronger/weaker commitments 
regarding to their identity, or their conceptualization of “deterrence” itself are 
strongly connected to their discourses and require deeper understanding in these 
senses (Lupovici, 2010: 717).  For instance, when Turkey attempted to deter 
Armenia from attacking Nakhichevan, two identity related issues affected Turkey’s 
credibility significantly: first, the Azeris living in Nakhichevan were also accepted as 
Turks by Armenians, and secondly the Armenians perceived the threats under the 
traumatic influence of events in 1915 that shaped the Armenian identity that they 
have today (Lupovici, 2010: 725). Consequently, the identity, social context and 
intersubjective understandings may play a significant role in a deterrence strategy 
and such a constructivist approach can help to develop better strategies of deterrence. 
Nevertheless, these insights still require empirical testing and support.    
Despite all the attempts to reinforce the deterrence theory and keep its 
relevancy in realpolitik, it cannot be the sole strategy that is employed in all cases. 
There is still need for alternative theories of strategic choices and “reassurance” is a 
remarkable alternative at this point.      
 
2.4.3. Reassurance 
As discussed earlier, George’s “coercive diplomacy” has already considered 
positive inducements as inherent part of the deterrence strategy. Moreover, Huth and 
Russett asserted that reassurance strategy, which is presented as an alternative to 
deterrence, is an “underdeveloped component of deterrence theory” as the rewards 
and positive inducements are tools of deterrence (Huth&Russett, 1990: 471). 
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However, as briefly presented below, reassurance strategy is more than offering 
rewards to the opponent in return for some concession obtained in other areas. It is 
supposed to address the underlying disagreement and “reassure” the opponent 
regarding that problem. For instance, if there is a conflict about a security issue, 
economic rewards can hardly persuade the opponent to concede. Only if the security 
concerns of the opponent can be addressed and satisfied, the conflict can be resolved 
without threat or use force. Surely, it would be naive to think that all conflicts can be 
resolved peacefully, but it is not the goal of reassurance strategy. Rather, the idea is 
to prevent unintended conflicts in which both sides do not intent to fight, but 
misperceptions and misunderstandings lead them to a cycle of violence. Thus, even 
though it is claimed that deterrence strategy already includes, or should include, 
“reassurance” within its own framework, this strategy has a distinct framework.   
In this sense, Kydd describes reassurance as the “flip side of the security 
dilemma coin” and asserts that the misperception and stereotypes that drive actors to 
conflict could be eliminated through reassurance (Kydd, 2000: 325). Similarly, 
Montgomery considers reassurance as a way (and also an outcome) of overcoming 
security dilemma under uncertainty (Montgomery, 2006: 151). Therefore, 
reassurance emerges as an alternative strategy which encourages actors to establish a 
collective security through eliminating the instigator of the conflict.  
For the practice of this strategy, Stein(1991) presents some different sub-
strategies which can reduce the likelihood of unintended conflicts and make 
alternatives of using force visible for parties. Firstly, even though the domestic 
conditions that lead opponent to brinkmanship are not open to exogenous 
manipulations, exercise of restraint can allow leaders to avoid actions which would 
exacerbate the pressure on the opponent. Yet, the important point is that verbal 
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reassurance is necessary but not enough to get a result; clear actions are needed 
(Stein, 1991: 435, 436). In other words, as Kydd(2000: 326-327) argues, the 
opponent can be reassured through “costly signals” which prove strong intentions for 
non-aggression.  
Secondly, leaders can promote negotiations and assure their opponents about 
their benign intentions by making irrevocable commitments, since it would annihilate 
the misperception and stereotyping. For instance, when Egypt’s president, Anwar el-
Sadat, initiated the negotiations with Israel, he was marginalized from the Muslim 
world which made his action an irrevocable one. In this way, Sadat’s commitments 
eliminated misperception and distrust between Egypt and Israel and convinced Israel 
that his intentions were benign. (Stein, 1991: 441,442). 
Lastly, collectively accepted informal norms of competition and limited 
security regimes can shape the borders of the process and provide transparency to 
some extent. (Stein, 1991: 444). However, undoubtedly, these reassurance strategies 
are not free from some limitations. Most importantly, Lebow(1983: 345) points out 
that reassurance strategies require “a degree of freedom from domestic, political, and 
bureaucratic constraints” which is quite difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, it can 
be argued that concession without reciprocity is a kind of invitation to be exploited. 
Therefore, the actors’ sensitivity to avoid such a risk would make this strategy 
unfavorable. In this sense, a combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies 
should be considered as another alternative that may overcome the limitations of 
each of them.   
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2.4.4. Combination of Deterrence and Reassurance Strategies 
             Lebow (1983) mentions the difficulty and riskiness of a pure reassurance 
strategy and discusses a combination of deterrence and reassurance as the ideal 
conflict management strategy. According to Lebow, such a strategy can reduce the 
likelihood of conflict by addressing both needs and opportunities regarding 
confrontation. However, there is a clear trade-off between deterrence and 
reassurance. The implementation of deterrence which increases the threat perception 
of adversary can easily hinder reassurance strategy. (Lebow, 1983: 345, 346). Similar 
to Lebow’s points, Montgomery(2006) points out the internal trade-off of 
reassurance. He claims that reassurance can be achieved through the revelation of 
benign intentions by an actor through decreasing its own ability to defeat the 
opponent, because this decrease will scale down the opponents’ security concerns 
and reduce its need for aggression (Montgomery, 2006: 160, 161). However, if the 
opponent has malign intentions, then reassurance would mean increased vulnerability 
which can be exploited (Montgomery, 2006: 153). Therefore, a combination of 
deterrence and reassurance strategies requires taking into account the target’s 
motivation and questioning whether it is a security seeker or an aggressor.  
When a would-be challenger is looking for gains/opportunities, a reassurance 
strategy might be dangerous in the sense of encouraging the challenger. If the 
adversary is purely motivated by needs, then reassurance strategies become more 
appropriate options compared to deterrence. However, if a would-be challenger is 
motivated by a mixture of needs and opportunity, then, a reassurance strategy might 
work as a complementary to deterrence (Stein, 1991: 449; Montgomery, 2006: 162, 
163) On the other hand, Tang (2007) emphasizes the reassurance’s role as an 
“invitation to cooperation” which reduces uncertainty and mistrust. It is stated that 
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“if you want to know another's true intentionyou extend an invitation to cooperate on 
a particular issue (e.g. containing a dispute)” (Tang, 2007: 194). Thus, according to 
the adversary’s reaction, whether it reciprocates or not, you can understand its mind 
and reduce uncertainty.  
When we remember the deterrence literature, the perfect deterrence theory 
provides most convenient theoretical ground for such a combination. As mentioned 
earlier, perfect deterrence theory suggests “reciprocity norm” in which an actor 
adjust its behaviors according to other’s behaviors. Thus, if an actor attempts to 
reassure its opponent, it is likely to be treated in the same manner principally, but if 
the opponent perceive this as a signal of weakness and attempts to exploit, then 
deterrence strategy can be put into action. In this sense, it can be argued that 
reassurance is an inherent component of perfect deterrence. However, the crucial 
point is that if defender starts with the deterrence part initially, it would make the 
reassurance part of the strategy irrelevant, since the threats would increase the 
mistrust between them and the opponent can no longer be convinced of goodwill of 
the defender. Therefore, what make a combination of deterrence and reassurance 
strategy a distinct alternative is it offers using reassurance strategy initially and 
keeping deterrence strategy as contingency plan.   
 
2.4.5. Where do we stand now? 
As a phenomenon of the Cold War context, the deterrence strategy and theory 
had a long way up to the present. Although the conventional wisdom had been based 
upon the rational deterrence theory, it received a wide range of critiques and evolved 
in order to stay consistent and respond changing conjuncture of world politics. Some 
40 
 
subsequent theories, such as perfect deterrence theory, endeavored to identify and 
overcome the inconsistencies and limitations of the theory. On the other hand, after 
the end of the Cold War, it is aimed by the fourth wave theorists to modify the theory 
according the new needs of the post-Cold War context. Even constructivist 
approaches- coming from a different background- takes part in deterrence theory 
today. 
Furthermore, some strategies which are discussed separately in this chapter, 
such as controlling or reassurance, have been considered as components of 
deterrence strategy for a long time. However, it is more appropriate to recognize their 
different natures and categorize them differently, since considering all of them as 
parts of deterrence could undermine the consistency and validity of the theory. 
Nevertheless, it is not plausible to seek a single strategy that can be carried out in 
most cases. Thus, it would be wiser for policy makers to take into account the 
motives behind the confrontations and combine appropriate strategies to manage 
conflict, if necessary. 
In the next part, the strategic options, which are conceptually discussed 
above, will be evaluated in the context of the Israel-Iran confrontation regarding 
Iran’s ongoing nuclear program. 
 
2.5. What Do These Strategies Mean For Israel? 
The four strategic options theoretically discussed above have advantages and 
limitations for Israel in the case of Iran’s nuclear program. Even though some basic 
tactics of the controlling strategy has been applied already, there are some other 
tactics that can be contemplated. Moreover, the other strategies still remain as 
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alternative options on the table and they require further analyses in conjunction with 
the theoretical discussion in the literature. In this part, the possible advantages and 
limitations of these strategies are evaluated specifically for the Israel-Iran case.  
 
2.5.1. Controlling 
Firstly, different forms of controlling strategy are on the table for Israel in 
response Iran’s nuclear program. Controlling strategy differs from coercion in the 
sense of including use of force, but it is also different than waging a full scale war 
due to its limited and purposeful nature. In this sense, some of the strategic options 
reflected in the literature, such as economic sanctions or limited military operations, 
can be considered as the tactics of the controlling strategy since they aim to limit 
Iran’s strategic options through using different means of force.  
Controlling strategy has been conducted by the international community 
collectively up until today and Israel has been relying upon this strategy in accord 
with the international community. Although the pre-emptive or preventive wars are 
stated as main tactics of controlling strategy in the previous part, economic sanctions 
are the cornerstone of this strategy in this case. These sanctions mainly includes 
“prohibition of Iranian oil import, a freeze of all Iranian state assets held by U.S. 
institutions, and eventually a travel ban and a comprehensive embargo on nearly all 
forms of trade with Iran.” (Maloney, 2011: 1299). All of them undeniably put the 
Iranian regime into the trouble in the sense of causing more expensive products with 
lower quality, cancelled financial credits, withheld technical assistance, and shaken 
business climate for possible investments (Amuzegar, 1997: 24). However, the main 
goal of the sanctions is not crippling the Iranian economy, but forcing Iran to refrain 
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from its nuclear program. In this sense, while there is a common understanding that 
the economic sanctions can force the Iranian policy makers to compromise over its 
nuclear program by increasing the economic and political cost to Iran of insisting on 
its nuclear program, the efficacy of the sanctions is open to question.  Moreover, the 
history of the sanctions tells us that the economic sanctions have remained not only 
inefficient but also counterproductive.    
There are several reasons that undermine the success of the economic 
sanctions. Firstly, the Iranian governments’ response to the sanctions, which can be 
described as “a multifaceted fashion, including defiance, mitigation, aversion, 
insulation and a self-serving public diplomacy”, allowed them to evade the costs to 
some extent. (Maloney, 2011: 1309).  The Iranian leaders declared that the sanctions 
cannot damage Iran’s interests, and even can help to increase Iran’s self-sufficiency; 
while the governments have been taking a set of economic measures (Maloney, 
2009: 142; 2011:1306). For instance, minimizing gasoline consumption and 
encouraging the compressed natural gas fuel for the transportation and increasing its 
domestic production contributed Iran’s self-sufficiency (Maloney, 2009: 142). Iran 
also broadened its trade network with new partners (e.g. Venezuela and China) 
which considerably helped to absorb the trade sanctions. In addition, Iran took the 
advantage of public diplomacy in the sense of attracting the international public’s 
attention to the human rights aspect of the sanctions (Maloney, 2009: 143). 
Consequently, Iran’s reaction to the economic sanctions mitigated the damage on the 
Iranian economy and politics.  
The economic sanctions also overlooked the nature of the Iranian domestic 
politics. They did not only strengthen the cooperation between the different factions 
of the Iran’s political system but also increased the willingness to resist the costs of 
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Iran’s policy (Maloney, 2009: 143). More importantly, the sanctions missed the point 
that the security policies have a clear privilege over economic policies in Iran. As an 
evidence of the privilege of the national security issues for Iranian policy-makers, 
Maloney reminds the case of Iran-Iraq war during which both the traditionalists and 
left-wing radicals accepted the implementation of severe economic measures instead 
of ending war that burdened a considerable cost to the Iranian economy (2009: 144). 
Therefore, the sanctions could not address the mindset of the Iranian leaders which 
prescribes economizing the sanctions instead of modifying the strategic calculus of 
the security affairs.   
Beyond the domestic dynamics of Iran, the recent regional developments 
impeded the sanctions too. Iranian leaders could not neglect the Arab Spring 
movements which reflected the desire not only for democracy and freedom, but also 
for getting rid of the Western influence in the region. Thus, the Iranian decision-
makers are unlikely to concede on an issue that has been framed as a national cause 
against the Western powers, in such a political climate in the region (Maloney, 2011: 
1308). 
Last but not least, the U.S. and Israel failed to establish a unified multilateral 
sanctions system. Some actors in the international system, particularly Russia and 
China, are reluctant to embrace the sanctions against Iran due to their crucial 
relations with Iran and their resentment against the U.S.’s policy (Maloney, 2011: 
1310).  Therefore, the economic sanctions that can only work when they are 
universal, unified and consistent have not been working properly in the Iran case 
(Amuzegar, 1997: 17). 
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In addition to its operational failure, the sanctions system also produces 
counterproductive results. Most importantly, the more the international community 
put pressure on Iran, the more the Iranian decision-makers and public value the 
nuclear program. In other words, “As severe sanctions devastate Iran, Tehran will 
surely be encouraged to double down on its quest for the ultimate deterrent” 
(Maloney, 2012: 146). Barzegar(2012: 160) notes, “The Security Council’s many 
resolutions against the nuclear program in the past six years led Iran build 
approximately 8.000 more centrifuges, increase the degree of enrichment by 20 
percent, establish a new nuclear site, and move many enrichment activities to a site at 
Fordo, which is far more hardened than other facilities against attack.”. Hence, the 
economic and financial sanctions have remained as a set of self-destructive tactics. 
Even though they could be considered as the elements of a carrot and stick policy, it 
is not wise to rely upon them as the primary tool. 
The other remarkable and much-debated option available for Israel is a 
preventive military action, still as a tactic of controlling strategy as long as it does 
not turn into a full scale war. A possible preventive military strike would target the 
nuclear facilities of Iran, and some other military bases in order to limits Iran’s 
retaliation. This operation might be conducted unilaterally by Israel or multilaterally 
by an international coalition with the leadership of the U.S.. However, since the 
international community, including the U.S., does not tend to embrace such an 
option, Israel might consider a unilateral preventive military strike to Iran as it did 
against Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007.  
Even though one may recall the Begin Doctrine and assert that preventive 
military action is still the most appropriate option for Israel, there are some obvious 
differences between the two cases and these differences increase the risks and costs 
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of the military option for Israel (Pedatzur, 2007: 522; Sadr, 2005: 61). First of all, 
there is a lack of intelligence about the exact location of the nuclear facilities, but 
what is known is that they are close by the Iranian settlements and well protected by 
the Iranian military forces (Pedatzur, 2007:523). Thus, a strike would cause a high 
collateral damage. Secondly, differently from Iraq, Iran has considerable military 
capacity for retaliation after absorbing the first strike by Israel (Weiss, 2009: 82; 
Sadr, 2005: 61). Therefore, the exit strategy is problematic since a preventive strike 
can easily turn into a full scale or a prolonged war as happened with Lebanon in 
2006 (Eiran, 2012: 184). It is implausible to expect Iran to remain silent when being 
attacked, in contrast to the reactions of Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 which did not 
respond the Israeli strike with retaliation. Moreover, Israel should be prepared for 
retaliation from the proxies of Iran, particularly from the Hezbollah (Kahn, 2012: 
115). Even if the Israeli Defense Forces are capable to deal with the Hezbollah or 
any other terrorist organizations, a possible retaliation’s psychological effect on the 
Israeli public would put the Israeli government into huge trouble. Furthermore, Eiran 
points out Matan Vilnai’s (the former Minister for Home Front Defense) speech at 
the Knesset in 2012 in which Vilnai complained about the lack of homeland 
preparedness to resist a strike against Israel. Furthermore, he gives a striking data 
that “ a quarter of Israel do not have the most basic physical shelter needed to 
whether sustained rocket fire. Gas masks, a basic safety measure against a chemical 
attack, are available to only 60 percent of the population”. (Eiran, 2012: 183). Hence, 
the day after scenarios of the military strike would not be that smooth for Israel. 
Apart from the operational risks, a preventive strike would carry significant 
diplomatic and economic costs. For instance, it would legitimize Iran’s further 
aggression both in conventional and nuclear terms and subvert the international 
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pressure on Iran’s nuclear program (Eiran, 2012: 185). Moreover, a unilateral Israeli 
strike might end up with the isolation of Israel from the international community. 
(Pedatzur, 2007: 524; Sanders, 2009: 84; Greenblum, 2006: 98,99; Sadr, 2005: 62). 
The U.S.-Israel relations would suffer a lot particularly. Additionally, a military 
strike to Iran would certainly influence the global energy market (Eiran, 2012: 185). 
Israel would have a bitter experience with this situation due to not only the economic 
impact of it, but also the wrath of the other actors of the global energy market which 
can appear in different forms.    
On the other hand, Raas and Long (2007) claim that Israel has the capacity to 
strike Iran with a tolerable cost and reasonable chance of success, in their 
comprehensive analysis of the Israeli capabilities to attack Iran. They do not deny 
that there are notable differences between the Iran and Iraq cases, but they emphasize 
that Israeli military forces also improved their capabilities for such operations (Raas 
and Long , 2007: 8). Although the locations of the Iranian nuclear facilities 
(distributed around the country) make it impossible to destroy all of them, the 
munitions of the Israeli Air Force with “enhanced accuracy and penetration” can 
remarkably delay Iran’s nuclear program (Raas and Long , 2007:12,15). Moreover, 
even though the targets in Iran are more challenging than the Iraq, Israel still has 
clear operational advantages in the case of a preventive military strike. Most 
importantly, the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force and air defense system are “not 
capable of competing with a first-class air force such as the Israel Air Force” (2007: 
21, 22). Nevertheless, Raas and Long (2007: 31) do not claim that the military strike 
is the most preferable option or the inevitable end of the story. The day after 
scenarios of a possible military operation, particularly a strong retaliation from Iran 
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in any terms, would make decision-makers reluctant to use this option, despite their 
confidence in their capabilities to delay Iran’s nuclear program successfully.   
Similarly, Kroenig(2012: 101) asserts that the risks of a military option are 
quite exaggerated and the U.S. can manage the risks of such operations. He basically 
claims that if other options fail and result with a war, it would be more costly than a 
preventive military action that is discussed today and, as time goes on, the likelihood 
of a successful preventive military action will decrease. Inbar(2006:100) also points 
out the costs of inaction and inevitability of the radical steps due to the inefficiency 
of the sanctions and diplomatic efforts. He argues that an intolerant deterrence 
strategy-and a military operation if necessary- is inevitable. Even though the threat of 
using force and a military option involve risks and complications, he claims, they are 
not more dangerous than the possible outcomes of the inaction (Inbar, 2006: 85). 
Therefore, a preventive military strike clearly has important risks and costs for Israel, 
but the decisive factor is that whether the costs of inaction exceed these risks or not 
More specifically, Abrams(2012: 28) puts emphasis on that Israel faces more 
danger than any other nation because of Iran’s nuclear program and he estimates that 
the Israeli forces can conduct a preventive military operation without the help of the 
U.S.. Additionally, he does not think a military action by Israel would cause a 
regional war, since the other Arab governments are also worried about Iran’s nuclear 
program (Abrams, 2012: 29). Thus, the military options are preferable and 
achievable for Israel according to Abrams. Yet, in contrast to him, Wexler 
(2012)argues that Israel should allow the U.S. to try non-military options, including 
sanctions and deterrence, first. Even if they fail, then a U.S led military strike would 
be the most preferable option for Israel, not a unilateral military action (Wexler, 
2012: 36). Ben Meir (2010) also underscores the centrality of the U.S.’s position in 
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Israel’s strategy. He claims that Israel may act unilaterally only if the negotiations by 
the international community fails; sanctions and other coercive measures do not yield 
any results; and the Mossad reports that Iran is too closed to have a nuclear weapon 
and so the threat is imminent. Accordingly, a unilateral action by Israel seems as a 
last resort and to avoid this last resort, Israel and the U.S. should synchronize their 
strategies (Ben Meir, 2010: 75). Nevertheless, some Israelis still suspect about the 
U.S.’s policy and insist on self-reliance, even though the Israeli officials have 
enjoyed this alliance many times in the recent history.  
Even if it is an inoperative and obsolete one, regime change policy should be 
noted here, as another alternative which has been implemented by the U.S. for a long 
time. This strategy aims to overthrow an adversary government and replace it with a 
friendly, at least a less dangerous one. Haas(2005: 58) states that the “regime change 
tends to be direct and immediate and to involve the use of military force or covert 
action, as well as attempts to isolate both politically and economically the 
government in question”. In this sense, it includes numerous risks and difficulties 
which make it an unfavorable option. Particularly, the second part of the strategy, 
replacing the old regime, is quite problematic as the U.S. experienced in Iraq after 
2003 (Haas, 2005: 59).  
Differently from the regime change, Haas mentions the “regime evolution” 
which “tends to be indirect and gradual and to involve the use of foreign policy tools 
other than military force” (Haas, 2005: 58). As a more radical version of public 
diplomacy, the regime evolution strategy specifically includes using the media and 
internet, assisting the dissident groups in Iran, proposing economic and political 
incentives, and shifting rhetoric towards the target public (Haas, 2005: 61). However, 
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it requires too long time and neither the U.S. nor the Israel is willing to accept such 
long-term strategies. 
Leeden(2012: 150) also states that the threats posed by the Iranian regime 
contains more than its nuclear program, such as terrorism sponsored by Iran. Thus, 
he suggests a regime change strategy through encouraging a democratic revolution in 
Iran which would be capable of overcoming all these threats. Supporting the local 
dissident groups in Iran (such as the Green Movement) to topple the regime, would 
be a wiser way of eliminating an adversary regime in comparison to the significant 
costs and risks of a military action that can also achieve the same goal, he argues 
(Leeden, 2012: 151). Even though such a strategy seems more plausible, it does not 
address the nature of Iranian domestic politics which is quite sensitive to direct or 
indirect interferences by the third parties.  
Wexler (2012) also points out another form of controlling strategy that can 
reduce the need for a military strike: “covert tactical operations”. These operations 
are conducted by the intelligence services mostly, and so do not burden diplomatic 
costs to governments. They basically include covert attacks to nuclear facilities, 
assassinations of the nuclear scientists, and cyber warfare (e.g. Stuxnet virus) which 
have been used against Iran many times (Wexler, 2012: 37). However, the covert 
operations cannot be considered as a primary tool, but only as a supplementary tactic.  
 
2.5.2. Coercion: Deterrence & Compellence 
As stated previously, the distinction between deterrence and compelllence is 
not clear generally. The case here reflects the situation described by Freedman (1998: 
19) in which the aim is to deter an undesired action which has been started already. 
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For example, as the prime minister of Israel demands Iran to stop its nuclear 
activities and dismantle its nuclear facilities, it includes both deterrence and 
compellence at the same time (Ho, 2013). Therefore, the deterrence concept, which 
is preferred in the discussion below, also reflects the compellence even if it is not 
mentioned specifically each time.   
If we assume that it is wiser for Israel to achieve its goal without using 
military force, deterrence strategy is a notable, but not smooth, alternative. There are 
numerous types of deterrence strategy and each of them has advantages and risks for 
Israel.  First of all, some assert that it would be the best (or the least bad) option to 
allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. In connection with the nuclear deterrence and 
(non)proliferation theories, Waltz argues that since the nuclear weapons cause a 
more cautious and moderate stance for the actors who have them, we do not need to 
worry about Iran’s -or any other states’- efforts for developing nuclear weapons. 
Even Israel will accept to live with a nuclear Iran, he claims (Sagan, Waltz, Betts, 
2007:147). Similarly, Pedatzur suggests an unconcealed deterrence strategy to Israel 
in the case that Iran develops nuclear weapon, so that a mutual deterrence situation 
between Iran and Israel can be constituted. This bipolar nuclear order in the Middle 
East would mean a stable security for both sides since neither of them would not be 
willing to pay the cost of attacking each other (Pedatzur, 2007: 531).  
Sanders(2009:85) also points out the “mutual nuclear deterrence” between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union during the bipolar Cold War context. The basic principle 
of the mutual deterrence during the Cold War was that both of the states had a clear 
destructive capacity, and so both of them were aware of that if one of them strikes 
the other, the defender would retaliate in a destructive way after absorbing the first 
strike. Consequently, according to mutual deterrence strategy, both sides would not 
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tend to strike each other in order to avoid the risk of being destroyed (Sanders, 2009: 
86). Yet, the mutual deterrence situation in the Cold War cannot be copied and 
applied to the Middle East context properly, due to the important differences between 
the two contexts. Sanders argues that Israel’s military capacity is not sufficient for 
mutual deterrence. More importantly, Iran’s and Israel’s military capacities (both in 
conventional and nuclear terms) and political decision making systems are not 
symmetrical (Sanders, 2009: 89, 90). This asymmetry is an important problem when 
we consider that the mutual deterrence strategy requires symmetrical capacities that 
would cause equal existential concerns for both sides, and symmetrical political 
decision making systems from which we would expect similar reactions in response 
to the structure. Adamsky also argues that the different strategic cultures may hinder 
a stable mutual deterrence situation. Thus, he adds, they need to study each other’s’ 
strategic cultures and mindsets in order to minimize miscalculations and 
misconceptions (Sanders, 2012: 192). 
In a more comprehensive analysis, Jones(2012: 202) evaluates a possible 
deterrent relationship between Israel and Iran in the case of Iran succeeds in 
developing nuclear weapon capability. He describes this relationship as “a form of 
ongoing negotiation” which requires stability and common understanding of the 
deterrence as a concept. However, the nature of the Iranian domestic politics is quite 
problematic for such a relationship. In the Iranian strategic culture, firstly, 
“concealment and dissimulation” are viewed as the legitimate tools of a discussion 
while a deterrent relationship strongly requires common understandings of suitable 
behaviors by all sides. Secondly, Iranians usually use complicated ways to express 
ideas which would undermine the deterrent relationship that must proceed through 
well-defined messages. Moreover, they are inclined to seek for a conspiracy under 
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the things which make them mistrustful against the other sides. Lastly, self-reliant 
and tough characteristics of Iranians can impede such a relationship that entails 
compromise to some extent (Jones, 2012: 202, 203). As a result, while a stable 
deterrent relationship requires clear communication on a common ground, the 
incompatible strategic cultures of the sides make it more difficult, if not impossible, 
to manage such a process.      
Notwithstanding the applicability of the mutual deterrence option, Israel has 
several reasons to reject the idea of an Iran with nuclear weapons. Firstly, Israel’s 
conceptions of deterrence impede a mutual deterrence option. Israel has been relying 
upon an asymmetrical deterrence strategy through which it can deter its adversaries 
without being deterred thanks to its military and nuclear superiority in the region; 
whereas a mutual deterrence situation requires two nuclear-armed actors who deter 
each other (Adamsky, 2012: 188; Jones, 2012: 209). Moreover, Roth(2009: 177) 
states that the Israeli decision makers consider this unquestionable superiority as the 
guarantee of the “peace” in the Middle East by deterring Israel’s enemies from even 
thinking of an attack to Israel. Accordingly, in order to maintain this superiority, 
Israel must prevent any adversary from being capable to threaten Israel’s survival 
(Ben Meir, 2010: 63). In fact, this approach is officially a part of the Israel’s defense 
policy since the President Begin decided to strike Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981. He 
formulated the Begin Doctrine which prescribes to stop any adversary developing 
weapons of mass destruction which are clearly existential threats for Israel 
(Adamsky, 2012: 187). Thus, referring to the Begin Doctrine, Israel is not willing to 
accept a bipolar nuclear order in which it has to relinquish its superiority both in 
conventional and nuclear terms.  
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General strategic thinking of Israel is not the only reason for rejecting the idea 
of a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel has understandable anxieties about Iran’s intentions 
with its nuclear program, due to Iran’s obvious support to anti-Israel terrorist 
organizations and the Iranian officials’ harsh rhetoric against Israel that denies 
Jewish holocaust and Israel’s presence as a sovereign state (Pedatzur, 2007: 514). 
Therefore, it seems that Israeli officials do not tend to accept the scenarios of a 
nuclear-weapon capable Iran, so the strategies that target to deter Iran from using its 
nuclear weapon capacity are not preferable for Israel.  
Israel needs deterrence strategies that can prevent Iran from crossing the line. 
A direct nuclear deterrence, relying on its own nuclear capability, can be considered 
as an option. However, interestingly, the nuclear ambiguity policy of Israel has not 
brought a successful nuclear deterrence capacity until today. As Adamsky(2012: 
189) reminds, “it did not deter Egyptians and Syrians from invading Israel in 1973, 
Iraq from launching missiles on Israel in 1991, the Palestinians from turning to 
violence during two intifadas, or Hezbollah and Hamas from raining rockets on Israel 
during the last decade”. This ostensible confidence that nuclear capacity provides 
Israel does not serve its purposes practically.  
Also, the “extended deterrence” is another type of deterrence strategy which 
can be employed in coordination with the U.S. Namely, the U.S. can deter Iran from 
attacking Israel by the threat of use of nuclear force against Iran, and so Israel can 
rely on the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella (Pedatzur, 2007: 526). However, Israel might not 
rely on another state for such a vital issue or the U.S. would not be willing to 
undertake this risky strategy (Pedatzur, 2007: 527). Thus, even though this strategy 
seems less costly for Israel, it is not free from limitations. 
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Although it is a contestable one, Israel might also prefer a deterrence strategy 
based on denial. Through this strategy, some defensive measures might be taken by 
Israel in response to a possible nuclear attack from Iran. For instance, as a way of 
passive defense, Israel can construct atomic shelters in order to be protected against 
any nuclear attack. It can strengthen its anti-missile systems too, as a way of active 
defense (Pedatzur, 2007: 529). Some scholars do not classify any of these defensive 
measures as a type of deterrence since they do not pose a punishment (Waltz, 1981: 
5). However, Freedman and Raghavan claim that limiting “deterrence” to the 
punitive actions is deficient in the sense of considering only one aspect of the 
adversary’s cost-benefit calculation. In other words, they state, “the adversary might 
be more willing to risk costs in retaliation. But if moving forward is going to be 
extremely difficult because of the obstacles erected directly in his path, then the costs 
of surmounting these- in the form of more troops, better equipment, greater logistical 
effort- will intermingle in his mind with costs resulting from the opponent’s reprisal. 
These types of strategies have been called denial” (Freedman and Raghavan, 2013: 
211). Therefore, the active and defensive measures can also be considered as 
different ways of deterrence strategy available for Israel.  
 
2.5.3. Reassurance 
Another important strategy available for Israel is using diplomacy and 
negotiating with Iran in accord with the international community. Although 
reassurance strategy has not been employed in a consistent manner neither by 
international community nor by Israel, these instruments can also be accepted as a 
part of reassurance strategy. In this sense, Weiss(2009: 86) asserts that Israel can 
pursue its goal by only negotiating and compromising with its neighbors, despite the 
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well-known difficulties of such a process. Bahgat (2006:20) also advocates that the 
international community should make use of the “carrots”, rather than “sticks” 
towards Iran while increasing the pressure on the nuclear material suppliers, not on 
Iran, in order to slow down Iran’s nuclear program. Indeed, the Iranian leaders would 
lean to an agreement that could maintain the Iranian economy, guarantee the survival 
of the regime, and recognize Iran’s legitimate right for peaceful nuclear activities. 
Such a negotiated agreement can also meet the demands of the international 
community with a lower cost which makes diplomacy the most promising options on 
the table currently. However, the international community’s satisfaction does not 
necessarily mean the same for Israel, as it has greater concerns and demands.  
In this context, Parsi (2007) reminds a covert alliance period between Iran 
and Israel which had been continued even after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 
1979.  Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and defeat of Saddam in 1991, Iran and 
Israel had been cooperating against these common enemies. For instance, Israel 
provided arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and lobbied in Washington to ease the 
tension; while Iran, likewise, provided intelligence to Israel for the Osirak operation 
in 1981 (Parsi, 2007: 79). When the end of the Cold War brought a new political 
climate to the Middle East, the Iran-Israel relations turned into a strategic 
competition over the regional hegemony(Parsi, 2006: 268). Nevertheless, a military 
conflict is still avoidable even though a stable and permanent peace is not realistic at 
this stage. For this outcome, Parsi argues, the Israeli policy makers should avoid 
undermining the negotiations between Iran and the international community. Rather, 
they should keep Israel’s security concerns on the negotiation table if they want to 
serve Israel’s interests (Parsi, 2007: 85). However, such a strategy needs a 
sophisticated plan and careful management. 
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More likely way for Israel to conduct such a strategy is relying upon a 
negotiation strategy which would be led by the U.S.. This strategy may start with 
conveying the message that the U.S. no longer pursues a regime change in Iran. 
Then, it could address mutual grievances and emphasize the issues on which they can 
cooperate, such as stability of Afghanistan and Iraq or transportation of the natural 
resources of the Central Asian countries to the West. The U.S. and Israel also have to 
shift their rhetoric and not threaten Iran publicly anymore, since they produce 
counterproductive results. The international community would certainly allow Iran to 
enrich uranium under tight controls, since coercing Iran to fully dismantle does not 
yield any results. Finally, the Iranians should be reassured that the U.S. does not aim 
to weaken Iran neither politically nor economically, hence the hands of the 
pragmatists in Iran can be strengthened (Amuzegar, 1997; Ben Meir, 2010; 
Mousavian, 2012; Takeyh, 2007). Through such a negotiation strategy, Takeyh 
states, the relations with Iran can be normalized. Yet, he emphasize that 
normalization of the relations with Iran should not be the end, but the starting point 
for more manageable discussions on the nuclear program or any other problems in 
the near future (Takeyh, 2007: 28).  
On the contrary, due to lack of direct communication and Iran’s 
determination for reaching the nuclear weapon capacity, Pedatzur(2007: 527) argues, 
a direct negotiation between Iran and Israel is not realistic. Indirect negotiations via 
the U.S. are more likely to succeed, yet the ongoing mistrust between Iran and the 
U.S. and Israel’s possible demands including fully dismantling Iran’s nuclear 
facilities would lead to a stalemate (Pedatzur, 2007: 528). Additionally, even though 
he considers the diplomacy as favorable option, Haas (2005: 66) also underlines that 
insufficient international support and Iran’s determination for the nuclear weapons, if 
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any, might break a negotiation process. Consequently, the possible negotiations are 
not free from limitations and obstacles despite the fact that they are quite promising 
for all parties.      
Differently, Chubin and Litwak(2003: 99) propose a different strategy based 
on the public diplomacy. They state that the Western states should try to influence 
the Iranian public and inform them about the danger of possible nuclear armament 
policies. They refer to a public opinion poll in 2002 which points out that 75 percent 
of Tehran residents favored negotiations and 70 percent of the Iranians desired to 
compromise with the international community (Chubin and Litwak , 2003: 102). 
Therefore, Chubin and Litwak(2003: 113) argue, the international community needs 
to focus on this opportunity through which it might be possible to compel the Iranian 
regime to compromise. However, even though this can be an element of a 
multifaceted strategy, it is not wise to expect the U.S. and Israel to rely upon this 
strategy as a primary tool.  
Consequently, even if Israel relies upon the ongoing diplomatic negotiations 
between Iran and the West, it can only be one aspect of the reassurance strategy. It is 
necessary for Israel to initiate direct communication with Iran and to enable other 
means of reassurance. It can be implemented in a few ways. Israeli government can 
soften its discourse towards Iran and make irrevocable commitments for a peaceful 
solution at the risk of confronting with the hardliners at home. These verbal acts 
would be perceived by Iran as costly signals. More importantly than verbal 
reassurance, Israel would reassure Iran with actions, such as ending the nuclear 
ambiguity policy and clarifying Israel’s nuclear weapons capability. Next, it may 
sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and join the efforts to 
establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Also, Israel may attempt to 
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establish a collective security understanding with Iran which would cover not only 
the nuclear technology issue, but also other problems (e.g. terrorism). At the end of 
the day, even if Iran does not stop its nuclear activities, there would be no room for 
security concerns for Israel, since such efforts by Israel may reassure Iran and it no 
longer needs a nuclear weapons capability, if any. 
 
2.5.4. Combination of Deterrence and Reassurance 
Neither of the components of this combination has been used by Israel yet. 
However, such a combination is promising in the sense of enabling reassurance 
strategy without taking big risk. The main point of this combination is that Israel can 
apply the tactics of reassurance strategy (explained in the preceding part) firstly, but 
it does not necessarily omit the deterrent threats those can be used if Iran reacts 
negatively in the further stages. Thus, the combination compensates the disadvantage 
of reassurance while some of the limitations of deterrence still exist for Israel. Israel 
still needs to contemplate the credibility and capability of its deterrent threat. 
Moreover, the counterproductive results of a deterrent threat may still come into 
play.   
Nevertheless, it can be added to that such a combination can also diminish 
some negative effects of deterrence strategy. Most importantly, since Israel will 
convey the message that it is acting with completely defensive motives in the first 
stage, a deterrent threat is less likely to provoke Iran. Hence, in contrast to risks 
mentioned in previous part regarding deterrence strategy, a deterrent threat as a part 
of such combination would not increase the mistrust and hostility between Iran and 
Israel. However, while the combination of deterrence and reassurance has such extra 
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advantage for Israel, other problematic aspects of deterrence strategy, which 
discussed before, still effective. 
 
2.6. Conclusion for Chapter II 
In conclusion, most of the literature mentioned above is about the general 
strategies against Iran’s nuclear program by the international community and there is 
a gap about Israel’s strategy which is considerably crucial in this crisis. Most of the 
studies tend to consider Israel as an ordinary part of the story rather than a key party 
of the nuclear confrontation with Iran.  
Even though there are some studies that particularly focus on Israel’s possible 
strategies against Iran, they generally lack a systematic theoretical framework and 
disciplined methodology which are certainly required for this complex issue. For 
instance, when they present possible strategic options for Israel, they neglect 
reassurance strategy which is one of the main elements of this research. Only 
Pedatzur(2007: 529) names reassurance strategies partially and states that the 
concept of “deterrence ad reassurance” might become more of an issue in the future 
of discussion, but it is a remote possibility.  However, as will be discussed further in 
this research, reassurance strategies are not less notable than the others, and so 
should be evaluated. Additionally, from the methodological perspective, there is no 
academic study in the literature that uses a game theoretical approach for Israel’s 
strategy in response Iran’s nuclear program.  
Consequently, this research can contribute to the literature in two ways. First, 
it can make room for new considerations through emphasizing the role of 
reassurance strategies. Secondly, the game theoretical approach would provide a 
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disciplined picture of the interactive game between Israel and Iran. Thus, the results 
of this research can attract the attention of both the scholars and policy makers who 
are interested in coercion and counter-proliferation strategies, the Israeli foreign 
policy or Iran’s nuclear program.       
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF THE STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
AVAILABLE FOR ISRAEL 
 
 
3.1. Why Game Theoretic Methodology? 
In this research, game theoretical models, as method of explaining the 
strategic interactions between the actors, are used to analyze the available strategic 
options for Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program. Such a model allows us to 
analyze the choices the actors have, the outcomes of these choices, and the actors’ 
evaluation of these outcomes in a simple and systematic way. Game theory 
particularly underlines the interactive nature of the actors’ choices in a game and 
attempt to present the dynamics of such interactive relations. In other words, the 
outcome of an action cannot be explained solely by that action; but the actions of the 
other actors in the game or the strategic environment in which they operate are also 
decisive factors that produce the outcome interactively. In this sense, modelling an 
international crisis provides us a comprehensive picture in which we can recognize 
the interaction between the actors and the structure as well.  
In the game theory, it is assumed that the players are instrumentally rational actors. 
They have specified objectives and an order among these objectives that reflects the 
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preferences of the actor. Secondly, they have a set of available actions and freedom 
to choice among these actions. Finally, an instrumentally rational actor always 
chooses the best action, which serves best the specified objective, among the set of 
available actions in order to reach a specified objective (Morrow, 1994: 17, 
Zagare&Kilgour, 1990: 39-44). In other words, a rational actor’s main concern in 
game theory is achieving the best action that would lead to the most desired outcome 
(objective), and so maximizing the expected utility. However, this is not a smooth 
process due to the own limitations of the actors, the interactivity with others’ 
decisions, and the structure’s own dynamics that may facilitate or impede the 
process.   
To put it simply, a game-theoretic model has four basic elements that must be 
specified prior to the research: the players, a set of available choices, the results of 
these choices (outcomes), and the utility of each outcome according to player 
(Zagare and Quackenbush, 2006: 99). Nonetheless, it is obvious that including the 
strategic interaction between the actors, the structural dynamics, and the other factors 
that exist in a real world problem in a research is a quite difficult and complicated 
task. In this sense, game theory basically aims to “simplify and abstract reality” by 
models for the sake of clarity (Morrow, 1994: 8). It does not attempt to cover whole 
complexity of the reality, but to get the essence of the situation and obtain 
generalizable inferences. Secondly, it is generally challenging for readers to follow 
an author’s cognitive map in an academic piece, particularly if it is about such 
complex and comprehensive issues. However, game-theoretical models force the 
researcher to discipline his ideas (and even intuitions), to specify the assumptions 
initially, and to present how the conclusions followed from these assumptions while 
building a model (Morrow, 1994: 6). Hence, it is easier to follow the way that is used 
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by the researcher to conduct that research. In other words, the transparent 
presentation of the research process allows reader to observe and test (reproduce) the 
logical journey from the assumptions to the conclusions.                  
In this sense, as the topic of this research is quiet complicated and requires a 
wide-scale analysis of different strategic approaches, the game theoretical model is 
more appropriate for the sake of clarity, transparency, reproducibility and 
consistency of the research (Mesquita, 2002: 69). In fact, my theoretical approach 
includes some constructivist points which might be considered as inappropriate for 
the game theoretical method. However, as Cederman asserts, “advocacy of 
theoretical complexity actually increases the need for models, albeit of a different 
kind” (Cederman, 1997: 219 -cited in Snidal, 2007:259-). Thus, the wide range of 
theoretical approaches of this research lead me to use a formal model which can 
reduce the complexity of analysis through its disciplined nature.  
 
3.2. Why Sequential Game Model in Extensive Form? 
The models in this research, firstly, are designed as sequential game models 
in which the actors’ act in a certain order in contrast to normal form game (a matrix 
game model) which assumes that the actors act simultaneously and without knowing 
the other’s action. This aspect of the model is important in the sense of allowing us to 
observe how an actor’s action would influence other’s action. The context of this 
research requires a sequential game model in which the actors’ actions are not 
simultaneous. In this way, it will be possible to analyze the interactions among the 
actors’ decisions and reflect the reality better. 
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This sequential game model is presented in extensive form (game tree). A 
game tree consists of nodes and branches where each node represents one move or 
endpoint in the game while the branches connect these nodes. The game starts with 
one player’s action/choice and continues with the other player’s response, and 
interaction among these choices as well. However, the essential part of this model is 
the initial assumptions that shape the game. It is required to specify the players, the 
decisions they have to made, the order of moves, payoffs of the outcomes, and 
preferences of the actors that will determine their moves in the game (Morrow, 1994: 
58). This initial task of the researcher is the most crucial part of the game since the 
rest of the game is built upon these assumptions.    
Extensive form games provide some significant advantages while analyzing 
strategic interactions. Such as, through the “counterfactual reasoning”, the extensive 
form games enable us to consider the actions that will never occur but have a notable 
impact on events (Mesquita, 2010: 97; Snidal, 2007: 257). Also, the extended 
decision branches in the decision tree, and the “subgame perfection” in the extensive 
form games, unlikely to normal game models, facilitates detecting and evaluating 
non-credible commitments (such as threat of use of force) of the actors which have 
major impacts in the Israel-Iran case. Furthermore, the extensive form games pave 
the way for (a) making analysis in the context of uncertainty and incomplete 
information in which the actors do not know each other’s decision patterns and 
intentions; (b) including the important link between the “domestic” and 
“international” affairs and (c)observing the changes over time, such as the learning 
processes of the actors.  
Lastly, the sequential game model of this research is built with the 
assumptions of perfect information which means “all players know the history of the 
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game whenever they make a move” and complete information which reflects the 
situation that “all players know one another’s pay-offs” (Morrow, 1994: 64). One 
may argue that the strategic interaction between Iran and Israel would require a 
model with imperfect or incomplete information due to some uncertainties embedded 
in the case. However, it is aimed to avoid the inherent complexity of the case and 
present it as simple as possible. Moreover, since it is an ongoing case and a wide 
range of strategic options are included, it is more efficacious to use a perfect and 
complete information model.  
 
3.3. Limitations of the Game-Theoretic Model 
Game-theoretic model is not free from some difficulties. First of all, the 
preference orderings and mindsets of the actors are the decisive factors that 
determine the solution of the game. Thus, it is quite crucial to justify the preference 
orderings of the actors, since any mistake in this stage can mislead the rest of the 
game. Moreover, it would be more difficult to infer actors’ preference orderings if 
they are not certain about their preference orderings themselves or if they attempt to 
hide their intentions to deceive other actors. Secondly, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to calculate the “pay-offs” of the possible outcomes in the game 
correctly, particularly when we need to estimate numbers for each pay-off. 
Nevertheless, the models are not designed to guess the outcomes perfectly, but to 
estimate the likelihood of specified results. Thirdly, as a general difficulty of the 
game theory, it is not easy to construct a model that reflects all aspects and details of 
the interaction between the actors. For instance, as mentioned earlier, when it is 
assumed that the players have “perfect information” about the game, some aspects of 
the real case are excluded for the sake of simplicity. 
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 The Iran-Israel case also includes these limitations. Nevertheless, since the 
extensive form game is the most favorable research method for this research, the 
difficulties can be overcome through a strong theoretical framework and careful 
work. 
 
3.4. Building the Model 
3.4.1. The Players 
The models of this research are designed to evaluate the strategic options of 
Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program. Thus, they are designed as two-actor 
games between Israel and Iran. Within the framework of realist international 
relations theory, states are unitary actors in the sense of being ultimate decision-
makers, and rational actors in the sense of being able to evaluate the set of available 
actions and to choose the best one according to the outcomes they promise 
(Mearsheimer, 2013: 74; Viotti and Kauppi, 2011: 39,40). Although one may assert 
that the sub-state actors are also involved in the decision-making processes, 
representing all of the elements in the states’ bureaucratic organizations would 
damage the simplicity of the models. Therefore, the states of Israel and Iran are 
assumed as unitary rational players of the games in this research. 
More specifically, decision of choosing one of the strategic options specified 
in this research can be made only by the governments of the Israel or Iran as the 
executive branches of the state mechanisms. For instance, employing a deterrence 
strategy by threatening with use of force or a controlling strategy by a covert military 
operation cannot be carried out by a non-state or sub-state actor. Also reassurance 
strategies, which can be executed in cooperation with non-state/sub-state actors, 
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would mean nothing to the other player without the state mechanism’s obvious 
decision to employ this strategy. Even though the non-state/sub-state actors have 
influence in this confrontation, it is assumed that this influence is reflected in states’ 
final decisions. Therefore, accepting Israel and Iran as the unitary players of the 
game helps us to preserve the simplicity and consistency of this research.  
 
3.4.2. The Domain of the Model 
The models in this research cover the strategic interaction between Iran and 
Israel at the present situation in which the P5+1 has been negotiating with Iran since 
2013 regarding the purposes and limits of its nuclear activities and Israel has been 
contemplating its response to this new context. When we consider that a joint action 
plan has already been accepted and the negotiators are quite optimistic about this 
fresh phase of nuclear talks, Israel’s strategic calculus is needed to be analyzed 
differently from the earlier periods. Thus, the models here deal with the strategic 
interaction between Iran and Israel in the present context which is in progress since 
the start of the negotiations in 2013.   
 
3.4.3. The Order of Moves 
The models include two actors: Israel and Iran. As the research mainly 
focuses on Israel’s strategy, it is assumed that Israel is the player which moves first 
and Iran reacts to Israel’s strategic choices. According to the nature of the outcomes 
of the interactions (Israel’s move and Iran’s reaction), Israel may again make a 
strategic choice. For instance, when Israel makes a threat to deter Iran and Iran 
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defies, then, Israel has two options again (implement the threat or not). Thus, the first 
moves come from Israel whereas Iran reacts to Israel’s choices accordingly.  
 
3.4.4. The Players’ Actions 
The players’ actions vary in each model of the strategic options. As Israel is 
the player which moves first, the first action in each model is application of the 
strategy by Israel. Firstly, in the model of controlling option, Israel starts with the 
action of “controlling”, which reflects all the tactics of a controlling strategy (as 
explained in earlier chapters), and Iran can respond by one of two actions: “back 
down” or “accelerate nuclear efforts”.  If Iran chooses the “back down” option, 
which means stopping nuclear activities, it brings players to an endpoint. On the 
other hand, acceleration of nuclear efforts reflects the situation that Iran is provoked 
because of Israel’s strategies and expands its nuclear program.In 2012, Shlomo 
Gazit, former IDF Intelligence head and a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University’s 
Institute for National Security Studies currently, stated that “an Israeli attack would 
not destroy the program, and could even accelerate it, while enabling Iran to 
legitimize its efforts diplomatically.” (Lappin, 2012). Moreover, Iran's Deputy 
Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi also stated that "Iran will return to 20 percent 
enrichment if a deal cannot be reached ... failure to reach a deal will be a disaster for 
everyone" while the negotiations are still continuing (Reuters, 2014). Thus, 
particularly deterrence and controlling strategies are provocative inherently, and it is 
not likely to maintain the status-quo if these strategies are applied but cannot 
succeed.In this regard, if Iran accelerates its nuclear efforts, Israel can respond in two 
ways: “continue controlling” or “back down”. At this point, Israel’s “back down” 
70 
 
option refers to situation that Israel no longer tends to prevent Iran’s nuclear 
activities. These choices by Israel bring players to two different endpoints.  
In the model of deterrence option, Israel starts with the action of “deterrence”, 
which reflects the threat of use of force. Next, Iran can respond by two actions again: 
“back down” or “accelerate nuclear efforts”. Similar to previous model, if Iran backs 
down, it is an endpoint. However, in the case that Iran accelerates its nuclear efforts, 
Israel has two options: “punishment (use of force)” or “not implement punishment”. 
These options also result with two different outcomes for the players. 
In the model of reassurance option, Israel’s first move is application of 
“reassurance” that represents all kind of attempts, including some concessions, to 
reassure Iran. Iran can react by the actions of “compromise” or “exploit 
concessions”. These two reactions by Iran bring players to two different endpoints 
directly. Thus, differently from the previous models, Israel does not have the chance 
to respond Iran after observing its reaction. It is because of the risky nature of 
reassurance strategy which would result with compromise easily, but also may leave 
Israel vulnerable against Iran. This is why it is considered necessary to combine 
reassurance strategy with deterrence in the literature, and so this combination is 
evaluated with a separate model in this research 
Finally, in the model of “combination of deterrence and reassurance”, 
application of the strategy is again the first move of Israel. The important point is 
that the first action of Israel is announcing that it is committed to implement 
reassurance strategy unless Iran reacts negatively in response. In other words, Israel 
starts with reassurance tactics in the first move, but also warns Iran that it still keeps 
a deterrent threat if Iran exploits the concessions made by Israel.  
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After the first move by Israel, Iran’s options are the same with the 
reassurance model: “compromise” or “exploit concessions”. This time, however, 
Israel has the opportunity to respond if Iran chooses to “exploit concessions”. It can 
punish Iran by the action of “punishment (use of force)” or it does “not implement 
punishment” and reaches a different endpoint. Consequently, each model has its own 
forms of actions, although some of them are same or similar. 
 
3.4.5. Outcomes 
There are basically four possible outcomes in the models. The first outcome is 
the prevention of Iran’s nuclear activities (S) which is the main objective and most 
desirable outcome for Israel, and the least desirable outcome for Iran. The second 
outcome is a compromise between Iran and Israel regarding Iran’s nuclear program 
(C). Third outcome is the status-quo (SQ) which reflects the continuation of Iran’s 
nuclear activities in a controlled manner through the negotiations with the 
international community. The last outcome is the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear 
activities without any restriction or control mechanism by international community 
(A).  
However, each of these outcomes should be evaluated with the probabilities 
of success of actions, and the costs of actions. Thus, each endpoint in the game trees 
includes players’ expected utilities from that outcome according to its preference, 
probability of success, and the cost of action. For instance, the controlling strategy 
has some costs for Israel (cc) including time cost, economic cost (arising from 
economic sanctions to Iran and from Iran’s counter-sanctions) and strategic cost (a 
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stronger Iranian regime which is consolidated in domestic level). Similarly, the 
controlling strategy has costs for Iran too (dc).  
Therefore, costs or probabilities of success actually can change an outcome’s 
expected utility for the actors. 
 
3.4.6. The Actors’ Preferences and Payoffs 
In addition to Netanyahu’s clear statements (Ho, 2013; Jerusalem Post, 2013; 
Al Jazeera, 2014), statements of the other Israeli officials, such as the statements of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Maloney, 2013) and Minister of Intelligence (Times of 
Israel, 2013; Armbruster, 2014; Booth, 2013) consistently indicate that the most 
desirable outcome for Israel is prevention of Iran’s nuclear program (S) whereas the 
least desirable outcome is, naturally, the acceleration of the Iran’s nuclear activities 
without any confrontation (A).  
Secondly, the status-quo (SQ) means the continuation of Iran’s nuclear 
activities, even though it will be a covert and slow progress. Even though both 
Netanyahu’s(Jerusalem Post, 2013) and Defense Minister Yaalon’s (Ho, 2014)  
statements are based on the argument that Iran is still accelerating its nuclear 
activities and buying time through the negotiations, continuation of status-quo is 
clearly more preferable than acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program without any 
monitoring mechanism by international community.Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
assume that Israel would prefer a compromise (C), through which it can monitor 
Iran’s nuclear activities and reduce insecurity for Israel, to the status-quo in which 
uncertainty and risk are high and undesirable for a rational actor.  
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Consequently, the preference ordering of Israel over the outcomes is as 
follows:  
1) prevention of Iran’s nuclear program (S) (payoff = 2) 
2) compromise (C) (payoff = 1) 
3) status-quo (SQ) (payoff = 0) 
4) acceleration of the Iran’s nuclear activities (A) (payoff = -1) 
In order to avoid the complexities arising from the long names and concepts, 
it is better to assign some numbers to utilities of each outcome for Israel. In this 
context, the payoffs of the outcomes for Israel are as follows:  
U(S) = 2, U(C) = 1, U(SQ) = 0, U(A) = -1 
 For Iran, as we can understand from the statements of Rouhani 
(Khalaf,Barber,and Bozorgmehr, 2013) and deputy foreign minister 
Araghchi(Gearan, 2014)Iran’s redline is maintenance of Iran’s peaceful nuclear 
program. Thus, the least desirable outcome is the prevention of its nuclear 
program(S). The most desirable outcome for Iran, on the other hand, is a compromise 
(C) in which Iran can maintain its nuclear activities by accepting some restrictions 
and a tight control system while avoiding diplomatic and economic pressure by 
international community. This position is repeatedly stated by Iran’s president 
(Rouhani, 2013a; Rouhani, 2013b; Guardian, 2014) and minister of foreign affairs 
(Zarif, 2014).  
However, if the current negotiations fail and the P5+1 continue to controlling 
strategy or Israel attacks or threatens Iran, the status-quo would be broken 
irreversibly. As deputy foreign minister Araghchi stated Iran would prefer 
accelerating its nuclear activities without facing any restriction (A) (Reuters, 2014). 
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Accordingly, Iran prefers accelerating its nuclear activities (A) to status-quo (SQ), 
since the status-quo means the continuation of the sanctions and diplomatic pressure 
by the international society which burden considerable costs to Iran’s economy. 
Therefore, Iran’s preference ordering is as follows: 
1) compromise (C) (payoff = 2) 
2) acceleration of the Iran’s nuclear activities (A) (payoff = 1) 
3) status-quo (SQ) (payoff = 0) 
4) prevention of Iran’s nuclear program (S) (payoff = -1) 
In order to avoid the complexities arising from the long names and concepts, 
it is better to assign some numbers to utilities of each outcome for Iran. In this 
context, the payoffs of the outcomes for Iran are as follows:  
U(C) = 2, U(A) = 1, U(SQ) = 0, U(S) = -1 
No numbers are assigned to the probabilities of the success and the costs of 
actions since they are used as independent variables that determine the equilibria of 
the games. In order to present how any increase/decrease in the probabilities and the 
costs change the utilities, and so the preference of the actors, only the symbols are 
assigned to these factors, such as “pm” as the probability of the success of military 
action or “cm” as the cost of the military action. 
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U(SQ) - cc 
 U(SQ) - dc 
3.5. The Game Tree Representations of the Strategic Options Available for 
Israel in Response to Iran’s Nuclear Program 
Four models have been constructed in extensive form for each strategic 
option available for Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program. 
 
3.5.1. Model I: Extensive Form Game Model for the Controlling Strategy of 
Israel 
 
Figure 1. Extensive Form Game Model for the Controlling Strategy of Israel 
 
                                        controlling                  
 
 
                                            back down                                                  accelerate nuclear efforts 
       
 
                continue controlling      back down                           
  
 
 
Note: Payoffs listed as Israel on top and Iran on bottom 
 
In the model of controlling option, Israel starts with the application of the 
controlling strategy as the first move and Iran responds by backing down or 
accelerating nuclear efforts. If Iran backs down, the players reach an endpoint. If Iran 
accelerates nuclear its efforts, then Israel may respond by continuing controlling or 
backing down.  
Iran 
Israel U(S) -cc 
U(S) 
U(A) 
U(A) 
Israel 
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3.5.1.1. Notation for the Model I 
The list below explains the symbols, abbreviations, and payoffs used in the 
game tree model above: 
U(S):Utility of the S (prevention of Iran’s nuclear activities)  
U(SQ): Utility of the status-quo (continuation of controlling strategy by international 
community and Iran’s nuclear program under inspection of international community)  
U(A):Utility of the A (acceleration of Iran’s nuclear efforts without any restriction)  
cc: cost of controlling strategy for Israel 
dc:cost of controlling strategy for Iran 
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3.5.2. Model II: Extensive Form Game Model for the Deterrence Strategy of 
Israel 
 
Figure 2. Extensive Form Game Model for the Deterrence Strategy of Israel 
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Note: Payoffs listed as Israel on top and Iran on bottom 
 
In the model of deterrence strategy, Israel starts with the application of 
deterrence strategy as the first move, then, Iran responds by backing down or 
accelerating nuclear efforts. If Iran backs down, the players reach an endpoint. If Iran 
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accelerates its nuclear efforts, Israel may implement the punishment or not. 
However, even if Israel decides to implement punishment, which would probably be 
a military action or another form of use of force, success is not certain. Thus, it is 
necessary to include the probability of (un)success of the punishment action in the 
model.    
 
3.5.2.1. Notation for the Model II 
   The list below explains the symbols, abbreviations, and payoffs used in the 
game tree model above: 
U(S):Utility of the S (prevention of Iran’s nuclear activities)  
U(SQ): Utility of the status-quo (continuation of controlling strategy by international 
community and Iran’s nuclear program under inspection of international community)  
U(A):Utility of the A (acceleration of Iran’s nuclear efforts without any restriction)  
cm: cost of implementation of punishment 
pm: probability of success in punishment (0<pm<1) 
1-pm: probability of failure in punishment (0<pm<1) 
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3.5.3. Model III: Extensive Form Game Model for the Reassurance Strategy of 
Israel 
 
Figure 3. Extensive Form Game Model for the Reassurance Strategy of Israel 
 
 
 reassurance        
 
  
                                                        compromise                                 exploit concessions 
          
  
 
 
Note: Payoffs listed as Israel on top and Iran on bottom 
 
The model of reassurance strategy is simpler compared to other models. Israel 
starts with the application of the strategy and Iran responds by compromising or 
exploiting concessions made by Israel as a part of reassurance. In the case that the 
Iran compromises, the players reach an endpoint in which both players get the utility 
of compromise. If Iran reacts negatively and exploits concessions, it does not end up 
with a substantial change at status-quo, but come at a price to Israel (SQ – cr), and, 
Iran would get benefits from concessions of Israel accordingly (SQ + gr).  
 
Iran 
U(C) 
U(C) 
U(SQ)- cr 
U(SQ)+br 
Israel 
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3.5.3.1. Notation for the Model III 
The list below explains the symbols, abbreviations, and payoffs used in the 
third game tree model above: 
U(C):Utility of the compromise  
U(SQ): Utility of the status-quo (continuation of controlling strategy by international 
community and Iran’s nuclear program under inspection of international community)  
cr: cost of reassurance strategy to Israel (particularly arising from the concession) 
br: benefits Iran get from Israel’s concessions 
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3.5.4. Model IV: Extensive Form Game Model for the Combination of 
Deterrence and Reassurance Strategies of Israel 
 
Figure 4. Extensive Form Game Model for the Combination of Deterrence and Reassurance 
Strategies 
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Note: Payoffs listed as Israel on top and Iran on bottom 
 
 
The model of the combination of deterrence and reassurance starts similar to 
reassurance model, but the difference is that Israel has the chance to response if Iran 
exploit the concessions made during the previous round: implementing punishment 
(use of force) or not. However, as mentioned in the deterrence model, the 
Israel 
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0 
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punishment action might be unsuccessful. Therefore two different endpoints are 
possible according to the probability of success of the punishment action. 
 
3.5.4.1 Notation for the Model IV 
The list below explains the symbols, abbreviations, and payoffs used in the 
fourth game tree model above: 
U(C):Utility of the compromise  
U(S):Utility of the S (prevention of Iran’s nuclear activities)  
U(SQ): Utility of the status-quo (continuation of controlling strategy by international 
community and Iran’s nuclear program under inspection of international community)  
U(A):Utility of the A (acceleration of Iran’s nuclear efforts without any restriction)  
cm: cost of implementation of punishment 
pm: probability of success in punishment (0<pm<1) 
1-pm: probability of unsuccess in punishment (0<pm<1) 
cr: cost of reassurance strategy to Israel (particularly arising from the concession) 
br: benefits Iran get from Israel’s concessions 
 
3.6. Conclusion for the Chapter III 
In this chapter, it is explained that why a game theoretic methodology is 
preferred for this research and how it is applied to the case. Firstly, the advantages 
and limitations of the extensive form game models are stated. Secondly, the elements 
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of the models (the players, the domain of models, the order of moves, set of actions, 
outcomes, the players’ preferences and payoffs) are explained. Finally, four models 
are designed for each strategic option (controlling, deterrence, reassurance, and 
combination of deterrence and reassurance) and it is aimed to present them as simple 
as possible. These models would be designed in a number of different ways, and 
numerous actions, outcomes etc. would be added. In this research, however, it is not 
argued that all aspects of the Iran-Israel relations regarding Iran’s nuclear program is 
discussed with all details. Thus, the limitation of the models here is that some aspects 
and details of the case might be excluded for the sake of clarity and simplicity.  
In addition, in the solution parts of the games, some variables (such as costs 
and probabilities of the actions) are not represented with specified numbers 
(payoffs), in order to indicate their role in determination of the equilibria 
clearly.Therefore, the equilibria of the games and utilities of the players might be 
represented as combination of numbers and symbols in the solution parts. 
Nevertheless, in the interpretation parts, they are represented with specified numbers 
to find specific solutions of the games and show the most likely scenarios. 
Next chapter will present the solutions of the models and interpretations. 
Also, main findings of the research will be evaluated in order to see what kind of 
theoretical inferences or policy recommendations can be reached. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE SOLUTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MODELS 
 
 
4.1. Introduction to Chapter IV 
In this chapter, the models presented in the previous chapter are solved and 
interpreted by using the backwards induction technique. Thus, the games are started 
to solve from the sub-games at the bottoms of the game trees. Since the players have 
perfect and complete information about the game here, a player’s choice at the sub-
game determines the other player’s choice in the upper game. In other words, the 
players have the ability to estimate what the other player’s next move will be and 
make their choices according this information. Additionally, counterfactual 
reasoning helps us to evaluate particularly the roles of threats and promises in the 
models. As the models of this research mostly include a deterrent threat in their sub-
games, counterfactual reasoning is helpful in the sense of detecting whether the 
threat is credible and capable or not. 
 As stated earlier, the main goal of using game-theoretic model is to present 
and combine wide-range of arguments in the literature regarding the strategic options 
available for Israel, by a disciplined method. Even though some aspects of the case 
are excluded for the sake of clarity and simplicity, most of factors and variables are 
85 
 
included in the models through the concepts such as costs or probabilities. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that most of the factors in this case cannot be evaluated 
separately since they influence each other’s value or likelihood. In this sense, the 
solutions of the models help us to underline the interaction between the actions of the 
actors and other variables. Also, the solutions of the models show that under which 
conditions which options are more preferable for the players and how the changes in 
the cost or probabilities of the actions may change the equilibria of the game. 
Moreover, even the impact of the actions and outcomes in the sub-games, which 
never occur actually, are analyzed through using the counterfactual reasoning. It 
allows us to project the possible future results and estimate their influence on the 
current behaviors of the players. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to explore 
the dynamics of the each strategic option and to understand how these dynamics can 
provide better or worse outcomes to Israel.  
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Status-quo 
(0 – cc, 0 – dc) 
4.2. Solution of the Model I (Extensive Form Game Model for the Controlling 
Strategy of Israel) 
 
Figure 5. Extensive Form Game Model for the Controlling Strategy of Israel 
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                                                  back down                                         accelerate nuclear efforts 
       
  
               continue controlling                             back down                           
  
 
 
Note: Payoffs listed as Israel first and Iran second 
 
In the model of the controlling strategy, in the sub-game at the bottom, Israel 
would not continue controlling strategy if the utility of the “back down” 
optionexceeds the utility of the “continue controlling” option [(-1) > (0 – cc)]. The 
most important variable at this point is the cost of controlling strategy (cc).Israel 
would back down if it is convinced that the cost of continuation would make things 
worse. 
 This possible choice of Israel affects Iran’s choice that it would know that 
Israel would back down if it accelerates its nuclear efforts. Next, this knowledge of 
Iran affects Israel’s choice at the top of the decision tree and Israel makes a decision 
Iran 
Israel  Prevention of 
Iran’s Nuclear 
Program 
(2 – cc, -1) Acceleration of 
Iran’s Nuclear 
Program 
(-1, 1) 
Israel 
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by already knowing that Iran would continue and even accelerate its nuclear 
activities in response to controlling strategy.   
Therefore, if [(-1) > (0 – cc)] Israel backs down in the sub-game. If Iran 
knows that Israel will back down, Iran accelerates its nuclear efforts in response to 
controlling strategy. Then, the equilibrium becomes: [CONTROLLING-BACK 
DOWN; ACCELERATE NUCLEAR EFFORTS]; and Israel gets the payoff “-1” 
and Iran gets “1”. However, it should be noted that if Israel knows that the 
controlling strategy will end up with the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program, it 
would not be a rational choice for Israel to employ controlling strategy at the top of 
the decision tree.  
On the other hand, if the cost of controlling strategy is tolerable, and so the 
utility of the “continue controlling” option exceeds the utility of the “back down” 
option [(0 – cc)> (-1)], then, Israel would continue controlling strategy in the sub-
game. Iran, who knows that Israel would continue controlling, compares two 
outcomes’ expected utilities in the upper game: U(S) (utility of backing down)and 
U(SQ – dc) (utility of accelerating nuclear efforts). Even though the payoff of Sis “-
1”, cost of the sanctions to Iran would make “acceleration of nuclear efforts” a worse 
option by decreasing its utility. 
Therefore, if [(-1)> (0 – dc)], Iran would back down in response to Israel’s 
controlling strategy. Then, equilibrium becomes: [CONTROLLING; BACK 
DOWN]; and Israel gets the payoff “2-cc” and Iran gets “-1”.  
However, if [(0 – dc) > (-1)], Iran would accelerate its nuclear efforts in 
response to controlling strategy at the top of the decision tree, despite of its 
knowledge that Israel would maintain the controlling strategy in the sub-game. This 
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would mean that Iran can tolerate the cost of controlling strategy. In this case, the 
equilibrium becomes: [CONTROLLING-CONTINUE CONTROLLING; 
ACCELERATE NUCLEAR EFFORTS]; and Israel gets the payoff “0-cc” and Iran 
gets “0-dc”.  
 
4.3. Interpretation of the Model I 
There are three sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the model of the 
controlling strategy. As can be observed, the cost of the strategy is the decisive 
variable that determines both players’ choices. In the first equilibrium above, cost of 
the strategy determines whether Israel should continue or back down in the sub-game 
and Iran’s response depends upon this choice. Also, in the second and third 
equilibrium, Iran makes a choice by evaluating the cost of controlling strategy to 
itself. Therefore, the equilibrium of the game can be changed through the players’ 
estimations of the cost of the strategy.  
It is assumed that the most preferable outcome for Israel is S (prevention of 
Iran’s nuclear program), and so the objective of Israel is convincing Iran to back 
down. This outcome corresponds the equilibrium that [CONTROLLING; BACK 
DOWN] where Israel gets the payoff “2-cc” (and Iran gets “-1”). In order to expect 
this equilibrium, firstly, Israel should make it clear that cost of the controlling 
strategy to Israel (cc) is tolerable, and so it would continue controlling if Iran 
accelerates its nuclear efforts. So, Iran would have to make a decision between two 
outcomes “-1” and “0 – dc”. At this point, Israel should convince Iran that it would 
get a worse payoff than “-1” by choosing accelerating its nuclear efforts which would 
result by continuation of controlling strategy and the payoff “0 – dc”. The only way 
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to convince Iran to “back down” by using controlling strategy is, then, decreasing the 
cost of the controlling strategy for Israel and increasing for Iran, or at least make Iran 
to believe that. This finding supports the conventional argument in the literature that 
controlling option can succeed if it burdens intolerable costs to adversary and 
tolerable cost to “defender”.  
However, as discussed in the second chapter, even if it is obvious that Iran 
has been paying a certain price because of the controlling strategy, it is questionable 
whether this cost is intolerable for Iran when we consider the value of the nuclear 
program for Iran. In other words, as Iranian policy makers give priority to the nuclear 
program in terms of both material benefits and prestige, it is not overstatement to say 
that Iran would tolerate a high cost rather than stopping its nuclear activities. 
Secondly, Iran has been struggling with the controlling tactics of the international 
community, particularly the economic sanctions and cyber-attacks, and apparently it 
has learned how to resist them. In response to oil embargo, for instance, Iran has 
been diversifying the sorts of its commercial activities which remained limited with 
oil and natural gas export until the embargo. Additionally, Iran has been diversifying 
its trading partners and exploring new markets because of the economic sanctions 
that damaged the commercial relations with the Western market. Therefore, it can be 
argued that Iran has the ability to keep costs of the sanctions at a tolerable level 
which decreases the likelihood of the preferable outcome for Israel.        
Even if Israel considers other forms of controlling strategy, such as a limited 
military operation, its cost to Iran is still uncertain. Moreover, such an operation’s 
costs to Israel are more striking than its impacts on Iran. As stated in the second 
chapter, i) lack of intelligence about the locations of the nuclear facilities, ii) 
problematic exit strategy that can easily turn into a total war, iii) high probability of 
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Status-quo 
(-1.5, -1) 
retaliation from the proxies of Iran, and iv) diplomatic and economic costs would 
increase the cost of controlling option for Israel (cc), and so decrease the likelihood 
of preferred equilibrium for Israel.  
Therefore it is reasonable to argue that the cost of controlling strategy for 
Israel is quite high, while it is relatively low for Iran. In this sense, in order to 
represent how these high costs impede the controlling strategy of Israel, it would be 
better to assign payoffs to cost of controlling strategy for both players. Thus, if we 
suppose that the payoff of cost of controlling to Israel (cc) is equal to “1.5”, and the 
payoff of cost of controlling to Iran is equal to “-1”, then the game tree becomes: 
 
Figure 6. Solution of the Game for the Controlling Strategy of Israel 
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Note: Payoffs listed as Israel first and Iran second 
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In this new game tree, Israel backs down in the sub-game at the bottom. If 
Iran knows that Israel will back down, Iran accelerates its nuclear efforts in response 
to controlling strategy. Then, the equilibrium becomes: [CONTROLLING-BACK 
DOWN; ACCELERATE NUCLEAR EFFORTS]; and Israel gets the payoff “-1” 
and Iran gets “1”. 
Consequently, this model stresses the role of the costs of the controlling 
strategy for both players. Particularly, the model makes it clear that since Iran’s 
preference ordering that prioritize the nuclear program increases its resistance against 
the costs and its resistance mechanism decreases the cost in general, it is quite 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the outcome desired by Israel. In addition, 
even though the provocative aspect of the controlling strategy is not presented in the 
game tree, defining Iran’s action as “acceleration of nuclear efforts” rather than 
“maintain status-quo” signifies that the controlling option would exacerbate the 
situation irreversibly. 
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4.4. Solution of the Model II (Extensive Form Game Model for the Deterrence 
Strategy of Israel) 
 
Figure 7. Extensive Form Game Model for the Deterrence Strategy of Israel 
 
 
 
                                                                                                    deterrence                     
 
 
                                               back down                                                  accelerate nuclear effort 
          
 
 
                                                                                                                     not implement punishment  
 
 
  
                                                                 punishment(use of force)  
                                                           pm                1-pm 
 
 
 
 
Note: Payoffs listed as Israel first and Iran second 
 
In the model of deterrence option, we start to solve the game from the bottom 
of the game tree again. In the sub-game at the bottom of the game tree, Israel would 
implement the punishment, which is the core of the deterrent threat. Yet, this action 
has two possible outcomes according to the probability of success. Moreover, 
Iran 
Israel Prevention of Iran’s 
Nuclear Program  
(2, -1) 
Acceleration of Iran’s 
Nuclear Program 
(-1, 1) 
Prevention of Iran’s 
Nuclear Program  
(2– cm, -1– dm) 
Status-quo 
(0 – cm, 0 – dm) 
 
Israel 
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implementation of the punishment has significant costs for both players and these 
costs are also included to the utilities of outcomes.  
 Under these circumstances, Israel’s utility from implementing punishment is 
[(pm).(2-cm)] + [(1-pm).(0-cm)] and it is equal to: 
[(pm).(2-cm)] + [(1-pm).(0-cm)] = [2pm – (pm.cm)] + [-cm + (pm.cm)] 
[2pm – (pm.cm)] + [-cm + (pm.cm)] = 2pm – (pm.cm) -cm + (pm.cm) 
2pm – (pm.cm) -cm + (pm.cm) = 2pm – cm 
Iran’s utility from the same outcome is U[(pm).(-1-dm)] + [(1-pm).(0-dm)] and it is 
equal to: 
[(pm).(-1-dm)] + [(1-pm).(0-dm)] = [-pm – (pm.dm)] + [-dm + (pm.dm)] 
[-pm – (pm.dm)] + [-dm + (pm.dm)] = -pm – (pm.dm) - dm + (pm.dm) 
-pm – (pm.dm) - dm + (pm.dm) = -pm – dm 
 
With these calculated payoffs, the game tree becomes as follows: 
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Figure 8. Extensive Form Game Model for the Deterrence Strategy of Israel with calculated 
payoffs 
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 punishment(use of force)                    not implement punishment  
 
 
  
 
Note: Payoffs listed as Israel first and Iran second 
 
With the knowledge of these payoffs, in the upper sub-game, Israel makes a 
choice between implementing punishment or not. If the utility of implementing 
punishment, 2pm – cm, exceeds the utility of the not implementing punishment, -1, 
then, Israel implements punishment. In this situation, Iran, who knows that Israel 
would implement punishment if it needs, makes a choice between accelerating 
nuclear efforts and backing down. If the utility of backing down, -1, exceeds the 
utility of accelerating nuclear efforts, -pm – dm, then, Iran would back down at the 
top of decision tree. Thus, the equilibrium becomes: [DETERRENCE; BACK 
DOWN] and Israel gets the payoff “2” and Iran gets “-1”. 
Iran 
Israel 
Prevention of Iran’s 
Nuclear Program  
(2, -1) 
Acceleration of Iran’s 
Nuclear Program 
(-1, 1) 
Israel 
Conflict  
(2pm– cm, -pm– dm) 
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Another possible equilibrium exists when Iran chooses to accelerate its 
nuclear efforts even if it already knows that Israel is more likely to implement 
punishment. So, when 2pm – cm>-1, Israel would implement punishment and Iran 
knows this. However, Iran compares two utilities, and if the utility of accelerating 
nuclear efforts, -pm – dm, exceeds the utility of backing down, -1, Iran chooses to 
accelerate its nuclear efforts. Therefore, the equilibrium becomes as follows:  
[DETERRENCE-IMPLEMENT PUNISHMENT; ACCELERATE NUCLEAR 
EFFORTS] and Israel gets the payoff “2pm - cm”, and Iran gets “-pm - dm”.  
In the last possible equilibrium, if the utility of not implementing punishment, 
-1, exceed the utility of implementing punishment, 2pm – cm, for Israel in the sub-
game at the bottom of the game tree, Israel chooses not to implement punishment. 
Iran, who knows that Israel would not implement punishment, compares the utility of 
backing down, -1, and the utility of accelerating nuclear efforts, 1, and chooses to 
accelerate its nuclear efforts. Therefore, the equilibrium becomes: [DETERRENCE-
NOT IMPLEMENT PUNISHMENT; ACCELERATE NUCLEAR EFFORTS] and 
Israel gets the payoff -1, and Iran gets 1. 
 
4.5. Interpretation of the Model II 
There are three sub-game perfect Nash equilibria again. Similar to previous 
model, cost of the strategy to both players play a significant role. However, the 
probability of success also comes into play in this model and becomes a decisive 
variable. In the first equilibrium, which is the most preferable one for Israel, Iran 
backs down in response to deterrence strategy of Israel. What leads Iran to this 
choice is its knowledge regarding Israel’s possible action in the sub-game at the 
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bottom of the game tree where Israel considers that its utility from implementing 
punishment exceeds the utility of not implementing punishment (2pm – cm>-1). 
Thus, Israel can reach its objective by increasing the probability of success and/or 
decreasing the cost of use of force to itself. The need for decreasing the cost to 
deterrer itself supports the perfect deterrence theory which argues that only rational 
threats are credible. For instance, if Israel threatens Iran with a nuclear attack, it 
would not be a credible threat since the possible cost of a nuclear attack to Israel 
(cm) would be quite high and decrease the expected utility of the “punishment” 
option, 2pm – cm.  Therefore, this increase in the “cm” changes the inequality (2pm 
– cm>1) in favor ofIran. Additionally, even though this equilibrium includes a 
credible threat that makes deterrence successful, the second equilibrium below shows 
that a credible threat is neither sufficient nor necessary for a successful deterrence 
strategy. 
In the second equilibrium, Iran accelerates its nuclear efforts despite the 
credible threat of Israel. The motivation for Iran is the better outcome of accelerating 
nuclear effortscompared to outcomeofbacking down (-pm – dm >-1). In other words, 
if the probability of success and the cost of punishment to Iran are not high enough, 
Iran would not comply with the deterrence strategy even though the deterrent threat 
seems credible. So, Israel’s threat might be “credible” in the sense of being rational 
to be implemented, but it might not be “capable” in the sense of being able to 
convince the target that the utility it can get from the status-quo is better compared to 
the outcome of the implementation of punishment. In this sense, it can be asserted 
that the second equilibrium of this model points out the argument of the perfect 
deterrence theory that the sufficient condition for a successful deterrence strategy is 
the capability of threat, not the credibility. 
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The third equilibrium points out the situation that utility of implementing the 
punishment is worse than the utility of not implementing the punishment for Israel 
(2pm – cm<1) due to the changes in the cost and/or probability. The cost of action to 
Israel might be increased and/or the probability of success might be decreased here. 
As stated previously, lack of intelligence and problematic exit strategy are likely to 
decrease the probability of success (pm); while high probability of retaliation and 
diplomatic and economic costs are likely to increase the cost of implementation of 
punishment to Israel (cm). In order to represent this likely situation, if we suppose 
that the probability of success of implementation of punishment (pm) is equal to 
“0.2”, cost of implementation of punishment to Israel (cm) is equal to “1,5”, and cost 
of implementation of punishment to Iran (dm) is equal to “1.5”; the game tree 
becomes as follows: 
Figure 9. Solution of the Game for the Deterrence Strategy of Israel 
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 Note: Payoffs listed as Israel first and Iran second 
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In this new game tree,Israel chooses not to implement punishment in the sub-
game at the bottom. Iran, who knows that Israel would not implement punishment, 
chooses to accelerate its nuclear efforts. Therefore, the equilibrium becomes: 
[DETERRENCE-NOT IMPLEMENT PUNISHMENT; ACCELERATE NUCLEAR 
EFFORTS] and Israel gets the payoff -1, and Iran gets 1. In other words, Iran, who 
knows Israel’s threat is not credible, chooses to accelerate its nuclear efforts, and the 
deterrence strategy of Israel fails at the endpoint.  
However, as the second equilibrium in the solution part suggests, even if 
Israel decrease the cost of use of force to itself in order to make its threat credible, 
the threats might not address Iran’s own motivations and could not burden an 
intolerable cost to Iran. In other words, a deterrent threat, which is supposed to 
increase the cost to Iran (dm), must address what is valuable and/or vulnerable to 
Iran. Otherwise, deterrence strategy is likely to fail since the deterrent threat will lack 
the capability to convince Iran to back down.  
In addition, when deterrence strategy is applied, there is no outcome that 
includes a compromise in which both sides can reach a reasonable agreement. 
Moreover, it would provoke Iran who could be convinced to limit its nuclear 
activities in accord with the international norms. Thus, deterrence strategy lacks 
flexibility and excludes some possible beneficial outcomes, as controlling strategy 
does.   
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4.6. Solution of the Model III (Extensive Form Game Model for the Reassurance 
Strategy of Israel) 
 
Figure 10. Extensive Form Game Model for the Reassurance Strategy of Israel 
 
 
 reassurance        
 
  
                                                        compromise                                 exploit concessions 
          
  
 
 
Note: Payoffs listed as Israel first and Iran second 
 
The model of reassurance strategy is the simplest model among others. Iran 
has two options in response to reassurance strategy of Israel: compromising or 
exploiting the concession made by Israel. If the utility of exploiting concessions 
“0+br” exceeds the utility of compromise “2”, then, it is expected from Iran to 
respond Israel’s strategy negatively and exploit the concession made by Israel as part 
of the reassurance strategy. In this case, the equilibrium is 
[REASSURANCE;EXPLOIT CONCESSIONS] and Israel gets the payoff “0-cr”, 
and Iran gets “0+br”.  
In the other equilibrium, if Iran gets a better outcome by compromising 
compared to exploiting concessions, 2>0+br, it would respond Israel’s efforts to 
reach a peaceful solution and compromise. Therefore, the equilibrium becomes 
Iran 
Compromise 
(1, 2) 
Status-quo 
(0 – cr, 0 +br) 
Israel 
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[REASSURANCE; COMPROMISE] and Israel gets the payoff “1”, and Iran gets the 
payoff, “2”. 
 
4.7. Interpretation of the Model III 
 Reassurance strategy is a way to prevent unintended conflicts resulted 
from misperception and mistrust. Moreover, even if it cannot provide the desired 
outcome (prevention of conflict), it allows eliminating the uncertainty regarding the 
other side’s intentions, although it is a risky way to learn other’s intentions. 
However, in order to get a compromise or to eliminate the uncertainty, it is needed to 
make some concessions and see whether the other player reacts negatively or 
positively. In this sense, if the other player reacts positively, a compromise, which 
provide the same utility to both players, can be reached. On the other hand, if the 
concessions made by the first players are exploited, then, we reach a different 
endpoint. 
 As we see in the model III, there are two equilibria. In the first equilibrium, 
the utility of exploiting concessions, 0+br, exceeds the utility of compromise, 2, and 
Iran chooses exploiting concessions made by Israel. Thus, the inequality, 0+br > 2, 
indicates that the benefit Iran can get from exploiting concessions is greater than it 
can get from a compromise. However, the benefit Iran can get from exploiting 
concessions is valuable only in the short-term, since Israel would be certain about 
Iran’s malign intentions and has the chance to adjust its strategy with this knowledge 
in further stages. Moreover, refusing Israel’s call to compromise would undermine 
Iran’s diplomatic efforts and invalidate its recent charm-offense towards international 
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community. Therefore, the benefit Iran can get from exploiting concessions is not 
likely to be high enough to exceed the utility of compromise.    
In this sense, if we suppose that the utility of benefits Iran can get from 
exploiting concessions (br) and cost of reassurance to Israel “cr” are both equal to 
“1”, then the game tree becomes as follows: 
Figure 11. Solution of the Game Model for the Reassurance Strategy of Israel  
 
 reassurance        
 
  
                                                        compromise                                 exploit concessions 
          
  
 
 
Note: Payoffs listed as Israel first and Iran second 
 
As can be seen in this new game tree, Iran gets a better outcome by 
compromising compared to exploiting concessions, and so it responds Israel’s efforts 
to reach a peaceful solution and compromise. Therefore, the equilibrium becomes 
[REASSURANCE; COMPROMISE] and Israel gets the payoff “1”, and Iran gets the 
payoff, “2”. 
Although such a compromise would require both sides to make some 
concessions regarding their red-lines, reassurance strategy promises the most 
desirable outcome for Iran while it has significant advantages for Israel too. Most 
Iran 
Compromise 
(1, 2) 
Status-quo 
(-1,1) 
Israel 
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importantly, it does not provoke Iran and not change the status-quo irreversibly even 
if it fails. Additionally, differently from the previous models, it includes the 
compromise as an option which makes the game a kind of non-zero sum game. Yet, 
Israel, as a rational actor, would desire more flexibility in its strategy which lacks in 
reassurance strategy in the sense of not having a chance to response Iran if it exploits 
concessions. Therefore, the combination of deterrence and reassurance would 
promise a better outcome.  
4.8. Solution of the Model IV (Extensive Form Game Model for the 
Combination of Deterrence and Reassurance Strategies of Israel) 
 
Figure 12. Extensive Form Game Model for the Combination of Deterrence and Reassurance 
Strategies of Israel 
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In the model of the combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies, a 
deterrence option, if necessary in response to exploitation of concession by Iran, is 
added to the model of reassurance strategy. In the sub-game at the bottom of the 
game tree, similar to deterrence model, Israel would implement the punishment and 
it has two different outcomes according to the probability of success. If the utility of 
implementing punishment exceeds the utility of not implementing punishment for 
Israel, 2pm – cm >0 - cr, Israel prefers implementing punishment. Iran, who knows 
that Israel would implement punishment if it exploits the concessions made by Israel, 
compares the utilities of compromising, 2, and exploiting concessions, -pm – dm. If 
2>-pm – dm, Iran compromises at the top of the game tree by considering the 
undesired result of exploitation of concessions. Therefore, the equilibrium becomes 
[DETERRENCE + REASSURANCE; COMPROMISE] and Israel gets the payoff 
“1”, and Iran gets the payoff, “2”. 
If –pm – dm>2, then, Iran would exploit concessions made by Israel, even 
though it has the knowledge that Israel’s threat is credible in the sub-game at the 
bottom of the game tree. This is because Israel’s strategy lacks the capability that can 
influence Iran’s decision in the sense not being able to make the compromise more 
favorable to Iran by increasing the probability of success and/or the cost of 
punishment to Iran. In this context, the equilibrium becomes 
[DETERRENCE+REASSURANCE - PUNISHMENT; EXPLOIT CONCESSIONS] 
and Israel gets the payoff “2pm – cm”, and Iran gets “–pm – dm”.    
In the third equilibrium,when 0 - cr > 2pm – cm, and so Israel does not 
implement the punishment in the sub-game at the bottom of the game tree again, Iran 
can still compromise if 1 >0 + br, even though it already knows that Israel would not 
implement punishment in response the exploitation of the concessions. The 
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equilibrium here is same with the first equilibrium ([DETERRENCE + 
REASSURANCE; COMPROMISE]), but it is resulted from a different 
counterfactual reasoning which actually reflects the equilibrium of the reassurance 
model.    
Finally, if the utility of not implementing punishment exceeds the utility of 
implementing punishment for Israel, 0 - cr > 2pm – cm, Israel does not implement 
the punishment in the sub-game at the bottom of the game tree. In the upper game, 
Iran, who knows that Israel would not punish Iran for exploiting the concessions, 
compares the utility of compromising, 2, and the utility of exploiting concessions, 0 
+ br. If 0 + br > 2, Iran exploits concessions in order to maximize its utility. 
Therefore, the equilibrium becomes [DETERRENCE+REASSURANCE – NOT 
IMPLEMENT PUNISHMENT; EXPLOIT CONCESSIONS] and Israel gets the 
payoff “0 - cr”, and Iran gets “0 + br”.  
 
4.9. Interpretation of the Model IV 
 The important aspect of this combination is that Israel starts with the 
application of reassurance strategy without putting aside the deterrent threat. The 
first move Israel which is labeled as “deterrence+reassurance” in the game tree 
reflects the announcement that Israel is committed to implement reassurance strategy 
unless Iran reacts negatively in response. In this sense, the main objectives of the 
reassurance part of the strategy are conveying the message that Israel acts only with 
defensive motives, and learning Iran’s intentions through its reaction to Israel’s bona 
fide efforts. The deterrence part of the strategy, on the other hand, aims avoiding the 
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possible cost of reassurance strategy in the case of Iran reacts negatively and exploit 
concessions.  
In the first equilibrium, which ends up with the compromise, it can be 
observed that the probability of success and the cost of punishment play significant 
roles. Firstly, if the probability of success is high enough and/or the cost of 
punishment is low enough, “2pm – cm >0 – cr”, they can make the punishment 
credible in the sub-game at the bottom of the game tree. Secondly, in the upper sub-
game, if the probability of success and the cost of punishment to Iran is high enough 
“2>-pm – dm”, they can make the deterrence strategy capable in the sense of 
preventing Iran from exploiting the concessions made initially as a part of the 
reassurance strategy. This equilibrium corresponds with the main objective of this 
combination, and it can be achieved by balancing the probability of success and the 
costs of punishment.   
One may be skeptical about the need for such a combination while the 
objective is still achieved through a deterrent threat, but there are significant 
differences. Firstly, Israel starts with the application of reassurance strategy which 
avoids provoking Iran and breaking the status-quo irreversibly. Hence, we see that 
even if Iran exploits the concessions and Israel needs to use deterrence, status-quo 
still can be maintained- although it would include some costs. Differently from the 
deterrence and controlling models, it is assumed that Iran would not need to 
accelerate its nuclear efforts in this model, since reassurance strategy indicates 
Israel’s defensive motives and does not provoke Iran with offensive demands. 
Secondly, even if Israel needs to implement punishment in response Iran’s negative 
reaction, this punishment action would be considered as a legitimate act by the 
international community because of Israel’s initial commitment to peaceful solution 
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and Iran’s violation of this attempt. Therefore, the cost of implementation of 
punishment to Israel would be decreased significantly. As a result, the objective can 
be achieved without needing a deterrent threat, and even if it is needed, it can be 
implemented with a lower cost.  
Thus, the model of this combination has a decreased cost of implementation 
of punishment for Israel (cm) in the sub-game at the bottom, and a compromise 
outcome which promise the maximum utility for Iran at the top. In this sense, if we 
suppose that the cost of implementation of punishment for Israel (cm) is decreased 
from “1.5” to “1.2”, the cost of implementation of punishment for Iran (dm) is again 
equal to “1.5”, the probability of success of implementation of punishment (pm) is 
equal to “0.2”, the utility of benefits Iran can get from exploiting concessions (br) 
and cost of reassurance to Israel “cr” are both equal to “1”, then the game tree 
becomes as follows: 
Figure 13. Solution of the Game Model for the Combination of Deterrence and Reassurance 
Strategies of Israel               
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 Therefore, the first equilibrium occurs and Iran compromises at the 
top of the game tree by considering the undesired result of exploitation of 
concessions. The equilibrium becomes [DETERRENCE + REASSURANCE; 
COMPROMISE] and Israel gets the payoff “1”, and Iran gets the payoff, “2”. 
In another possible equilibrium, the utility of exploiting concessions is greater 
than the utility of compromising for Iran, even though it is aware of a credible 
deterrent threat in the sub-game at the bottom of the game tree. However, the 
inequality that brings us this outcome, –pm – dm>2, is not probable. Since 0 < pm < 
1, “dm” must be a negative number in order to satisfy this inequality which is 
technically impossible. Therefore, it can be concluded that if a credible and capable 
threat exists in the sub-game at the bottom, Iran would not exploit concessions. This 
finding also supports the logic of the combination of deterrence and reassurance 
strategy. 
The third equilibrium is similar to the best scenario in reassurance model in 
which deterrent threat never exists. Namely, if Iran knows that the utility of 
compromise is greater than the utility of exploiting concessions, it prefers 
compromising even in the absence of a credible threat in the sub-game at the bottom. 
At this point, one may argue that the combination of deterrence and reassurance is no 
longer relevant, since Iran chooses compromise in any case. However, as stated 
earlier, reassurance strategy lacks flexibility in the case that the benefits Iran can get 
from exploiting concessions increase, and so Iran attempts to exploit concessions. 
This bad scenario is reflected in the last equilibrium where Iran, who knows that 
Israel would not punish Iran for exploiting the concessions, compares the utility of 
compromising, 2, and the utility of exploiting concessions, 0 + br. If “br” is greater 
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than “2”, then, Iran would exploit concessions. The objective of combining 
deterrence and reassurance strategies is avoiding this possible bad scenario for Israel.  
 
4.10. Conclusion for Chapter IV 
What has been done in this chapter is presentation of the dynamics of each 
strategic option and their influence on the players’ choices. In the solution parts of 
the games, no specific numbers are assigned to the cost or probabilities of the actions 
in order to show that if they increase or decrease, they can change the equilibria, and 
so the optimum strategy for Israel. However, in the interpretation parts, some specific 
numbers are assigned to probability of success and costs to find specific solutions 
which reflect the most likely scenarios for each strategic option. To sum up, all the 
possible equilibria for each option are presented in the solution parts, and the most 
likely equilibria are pointed out in the interpretation parts.  
The models contribute to literature in the sense of including the combination 
of deterrence and reassurance as an alternative option, of which assertions are not 
discussed or applied contemporary cases to see whether it can compensate the 
problematic sides of deterrence and reassurance strategies. The solution of the model 
of this combination does not only explore its pros and cons, but also generates some 
insights regarding the dynamics of the strategy.       
In the models of deterrence and controlling strategies, a well-discussed issue 
in the literature that the deterrence and controlling strategies break the status-quo by 
provoking the target is presented as an initial assumption. In the both deterrence and 
controlling models, when Israel applies these strategies, Iran backs down or 
accelerates its nuclear efforts, rather than maintaining status-quo. This assumption 
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significantly affected the rest of the model, since the outcomes and payoffs are 
changed. Most importantly, it increased the risk and cost for Israel if it applies the 
strategy and it fails. Thus, it decreased the flexibility of Israel’s strategy which is not 
a preferable situation for a rational player.    
Secondly, it is observed in the extensive form game models of the deterrence 
and controlling strategies that Israel needs to increase the cost of punishment to Iran 
and the probability of success of the punishment action, while it needs to decrease 
the cost of punishment to Israel. In other words, these are the variables what would 
make these strategies more likely to succeed. However, as discussed previously, it is 
a challenging task for Israel. For example, Iran has been coping with the costs of the 
economic sanctions through its economy of resistance. Also, it seems difficult for 
Israel to decrease the cost and to increase the probability of success regarding use of 
force in present-day conditions due to the reasons mentioned in the related part of 
this chapter. Therefore, it can be argued that Israel does not have the ability to 
establish a credible and capable threat, which would convince Iran to back down and 
accept stopping its entire nuclear program. 
In the model of reassurance strategy, it is pointed out that implementation of 
reassurance strategy promises better outcomes, but it lacks flexibility similar to 
deterrence and controlling strategies. It leaves Israel vulnerable against Iran if Iran 
tends to exploit the concessions made by Israel. In order to overcome this problem, a 
combination with deterrence is proposed in the literature. 
In the model of the combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies 
Israel starts with the reassurance strategy without putting aside the deterrent threat 
that can come into play if Iran exploits the concessions. The objective is making use 
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of reassurance strategy, but avoiding the possible losses which might result from the 
inflexibility. In addition to flexibility obtained by this combination, it has some clear 
advantages to Israel. Firstly, since it starts with reassurance strategy, which indicates 
Israel’s benign intentions, it allows maintaining the status-quo even if the strategy 
fails. Additionally, the reassurance action at the top of the game tree decreases the 
cost of a possible punishment in further games, and so increases the credibility of 
deterrent threat. Accordingly, existence of a credible deterrent threat at the sub-game, 
increase the capability of reassurance strategy in the sense of encouraging Iran to 
choose compromise at the top of the game tree.  
However, this strategy also has some limitations. Most importantly, even 
though it is preceded by the reassurance strategy, keeping a deterrent threat available 
would still provoke Iran. Thus, it is crucial to manage the process in a sophisticated 
way in the sense of avoiding misperceptions. It would be easier to maintain a positive 
discourse that avoids escalation of mistrust and hostility, when we consider that 
Israel does not have to reiterate a provocative discourse of threat since it already has 
enough credibility due to its actions in recent history (Iraq and Syria cases). 
Moreover, if the reassurance part of the strategy is implemented consistently, Iran 
would be convinced that Israel’s deterrent threat is a defensive precaution. 
Consequently, deterrence and controlling strategies are too risky and 
inflexible in the sense of provoking Iran and damaging the status-quo irreversibly. 
Moreover, it seems difficult to satisfy the requirements of these strategies, such as 
increasing probabilities of success and cost of punishment to Iran, in order to achieve 
desired outcome. Reassurance strategy, on the other hand, promises relatively better 
outcomes, but it also lacks flexibility in the sense of leaving Israel vulnerable if Iran 
reacts negatively. Finally, the combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies 
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appears as an alternative which is capable to encourage Iran to compromise, and 
flexible enough to react Iran if the reassurance efforts fail.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research aims to address one of the most important issues in 
international affairs which has been drawing attention of not only the great powers, 
but also the regional powers, such as Israel, Turkey or the Gulf countries. In this 
thesis, it is assumed that Israel has a more essential role among others, and so, a 
comprehensive analysis of Israel’s possible strategies is needed. Although some 
studies about Israel’s policy towards Iran already exist in the literature, they lack 
either a wide-ranging theoretical approach or a well-organized research method. In 
this sense, this research aimed to answer the questions that what are the strategic 
options available for Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program and what are these 
strategies’ advantages and limitations for Israel?  
In the first chapter, importance of the subject is introduced firstly. Later, the 
purpose of the research and the method used for this purpose are stated. Additionally, 
the main findings and contribution to the literature are summarized in this chapter. 
In the second chapter, the history and future of the Iran’s nuclear program, 
and the international actors’ reactions are explained briefly. Also, Israel’s threat 
perceptions, which determine its strategic moves, are discussed. Due to these threat 
113 
 
perceptions, four strategic options are defined as available strategies for Israel: 
controlling, coercion (deterrence), reassurance, combination of deterrence and 
reassurance. Primarily, these strategies are discussed theoretically free from the Iran-
Israel case in order to comprehend their theoretical evolution in time. Even though 
these strategies have been used interchangeably by some scholars, this thesis it is 
assumed that each of them has different dynamics, natures and distinct frameworks 
(Freedman, 2004). After this abstract discussion, the literature regarding the 
implementation of these strategies by Israel is presented in the second chapter. The 
pros and cons of these strategies for Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program are 
discussed. The interpretations of the models in further chapters are mostly based 
upon this discussion.   
In the third chapter, the advantages and limitations of the game theory are 
stated firstly. It is underlined that game-theoretic modelling provides a disciplined, 
well-organized and transparent research design, even though it requires exclusion of 
the some elements of the case in order to preserve simplicity. Moreover, since the 
research aims to stress the interactive nature of the Israel’s and Iran’s decisions, the 
models are designed as extensive form game trees. The elements of the models and 
the game trees of the each strategic option are also presented in this chapter. 
In the fourth chapter, the models are solved through the backward induction 
technique, which starts to solve the game from the bottom of the game tree. It 
allowed us to observe that how the possible actions of the actors in the sub-games 
influence the real-time decision of the actors. The models here, primarily, 
highlighted the key role of the costs and probabilities of success of the actions. Next, 
they points out that how the equilibria change according to Israel’s capability to 
increase the probability of success and costs to Iran, and decrease the costs to Israel. 
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Given the discussion in the second chapter, the conditions are not in favor of Israel in 
the sense of high costs of controlling strategy and deterrent threat, and the low 
probability of success of the punitive action in deterrence games. Thus, lack of the 
capability that can balance these costs and probabilities impedes the deterrence and 
controlling strategies for Israel. In addition, the provocative nature of these strategies 
decreases the flexibility in the sense of forcing Iran to break the status-quo and to 
follow more aggressive policies. 
 The findings also showed that the reassurance strategy, which is presented as 
the alternative of deterrence in the literature, is not a smooth option, even though it 
can promise better outcomes (Stein, 1991). As Israel might become vulnerable if Iran 
reacts in a hostile manner to the reassurance efforts of Israel, this strategy also lacks 
flexibility, and so it is not a favorable one for Israel. 
 Lastly, the model of combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies 
points out that if Israel has a capable deterrent threat in the sub-game, it is more 
likely for Iran to compromise in the upper game. Thus, existence of a deterrent threat 
prevents Iran from exploiting the concession made by Israel. This result supports the 
argument in the literature that it would be more efficient to combine deterrence and 
reassurance strategies since it can avoid the risks and costs of a single deterrence or 
reassurance strategy (Stein, 1991; Lebow and Stein, 1983). Furthermore, the 
important point with this strategy is that Israel starts with the reassurance strategy 
which avoids provoking Iran, and so the status-quo can be still maintained even if the 
strategy fails. This shows how this combination avoids the cost of a single deterrence 
strategy. Consequently, this combination avoids the cost of deterrence strategy by not 
provoking Iran, and avoids the risk of reassurance strategy by preventing Iran from 
exploiting Israel’s concessions. 
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The results obtained from this research contribute the literature in two ways. 
Firstly, it enhances the literature concerning Israel’s stance towards Iran’s nuclear 
program, by evaluating a wide-range of strategic approaches in the same research. 
More importantly, it uses a game-theoretical modelling which is quite helpful in the 
sense of simplifying such a complicated and problematic case. Secondly, the model 
of the combination of deterrence and reassurance can be accepted as an application 
of this underdeveloped alternative strategy to a current case. It is concluded such a 
combination is theoretically consistent with the perfect deterrence theory’s 
arguments, particularly its emphasis on rationality of threats and the reciprocity norm 
(Zagare and Kilgour, 2000; Quackenbush, 2010). Therefore, combination of these 
strategies can be based upon the perfect deterrence theory’s theoretical framework. 
The results of this thesis also have some policy implications for the actors. 
First of all, Israel’s current stance is based upon the assumption that Iran is buying 
time through the negotiations while it is continuing nuclear activities with the aim of 
reaching nuclear weapons capability. However, although there is no way to be sure 
that whether Iran aims having nuclear weapons or not, it is reasonable to argue that 
using its nuclear technology for weapons or peaceful goals is a decision will be made 
by Iran in the future (Özcan and Özdamar, 2009: 131). In this sense, the Iranian 
policy makers can change their minds according to developments in the international 
system and region, or the other actors’ policies towards Iran. Thus, if Israel prefers 
controlling strategy (by pressuring international community to increase sanctions, 
continuing covert operations and cyber-attacks, or by a possible limited military 
operation) or deterrence strategy ( by an overt threat of use of force), it may only 
provoke Iran and lead it to contemplate developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, the 
high costs and low probabilities of success make these strategies inefficient. 
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Furthermore, the benefits Iran can get from a compromise (continuation of its 
nuclear program in accord with the international norms, easing of economic 
sanctions and isolation by the Western states) is higher than the benefits it can get by 
exploiting the bona fide efforts of international actors, including Israel. Therefore, if 
Israel’s leaders attempt to reassure Iran, it is more likely to be welcomed by Iran’s 
leaders. Nevertheless, differently from the other actors in the P5+1, Israel’s leaders 
might have plausible concerns about the possibility that Iran would exploit the 
concession made by Israel due to hostile relations in late history. At this point, 
combination of deterrence and reassurance, the strategy recommended in this thesis, 
can be the most favorable option in the sense of minimizing the risk and cost as far as 
possible. In order to apply this strategy, Israel should support the diplomatic efforts 
made by the P5+1 firstly. Then, direct communication is needed to be established 
between Iran and Israel to avoid possible misperceptions. Meanwhile, it is essential 
for Israel’s leaders to soften their discourse towards Iran. Although it is unlikely to 
expect construction of a collective security understanding in short term, Israeli policy 
makers can reassure Iran that Israel is not a threat for Iran. Irrevocable commitments 
and some courageous actions by Israel, such as ending the nuclear ambiguity policy 
(declaring whether Israel has nuclear weapons or not) and signing the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would be more effective than verbal 
reassurance.  
By applying such a reassurance strategy, Israel can convince Iran to 
compromise and not to develop nuclear weapons- if Iran really aims this. If 
reassurance strategy fails, Israel can contemplate deterrence option against Iran. The 
important point is that even if reassurance fails, Israel can still get two important 
benefits: i) it becomes certain about Iran’s malign intentions, if any, and evades 
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being considered as trouble-maker by the international community ii) it can apply 
deterrence strategy, and other strategic options as well, with lower cost and more 
support by its allies. In addition, in the case that Israel succeeds in reassuring Iran in 
the nuclear confrontation, it can pave the way for further cooperation over other 
issues in the region.   
Such a policy by Israel would also facilitate the task of P5+1, particularly the 
United States. First of all, the P5+1 countries have been making effort to both find a 
diplomatic solution to the nuclear confrontation with Iran; and conserve their positive 
relations with Israel who strongly opposes this diplomatic process and makes 
pressures on these countries. In this sense, if Israel welcomes the diplomatic efforts, 
it would make things easier for the P5+1 countries. Secondly, observing Iran’s 
reactions to Israel’s reassurance strategy would be another chance for the P5+1 to 
test Iran’s intentions. Consequently, a constructive stance by Israel would contribute 
to positive atmosphere in the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1.          
Beyond the contributions to literature and the policy implications mentioned 
above, this thesis might inspire some future researches about the Iran-Israel case and 
strategies discussed here. Different forms of game-theoretic models with different 
assumptions can shed light on the different aspects of the case. For instance, an 
imperfect information game model would underline the uncertainties and mistrust 
between the actors. Furthermore, the basic application of the combination of 
deterrence and reassurance strategies in this thesis might be improved, and more 
specific insights can be obtained about this strategy.    
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